

JPRS 72122

26 October 1978

U S S R

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1390

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20000215 115

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattribute parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet journal articles displaying a copyright notice and included in this report are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Further reproduction of these copyrighted journal articles is prohibited without permission from the copyright agency of the Soviet Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 72122	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.	
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1390				5. Report Date 26 October 1978	
				6.	
7. Author(s)				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
				11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
				14.	
15. Supplementary Notes					
16. Abstracts The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel					
17b. Identifiers 'Open-Ended Terms'					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C					
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 106	20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price

26 October 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1390

CONTENTS

PAGE

Indoctrination Guide for Strengthening Military Defense (A. Skryl'nik; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Aug 78)	1
Armed Forces Journal Stresses Importance of Vigilance (Editorial; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, 1978)	18
Role of Commander in Organizing Logistics Examined (I. Golushko; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	26
Training of Radar Operators Described (L. Grachyov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	29
Radar Maintenance Under Poor Conditions Reviewed (V. Revuka; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	31
Moral, Political Training of Servicemen Described (I. Mikhailov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	33
Importance of Combat Cooperation Discussed (L. Korzun; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	35
Review of Book on Soviet Armed Forces (N. Khlynov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 78)	38
Ground Training Procedures for Air Crews Described (A. Osipenko; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, Aug 78)	40
Organizing On-the-Job Training of Air Cadets (N. Sukhochev, I. Sherstobitov; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, Aug 78)	44
Technical Critiques Improve Aircraft Servicing Procedures (V. Trifonov; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, Aug 78)	48
In-Flight Refueling Experiences Recounted (G. Vishnevskiy; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, Aug 78)	52

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Adverse Consequences of Flight Instructor Error Described (Ye. Bryakov; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, Aug 78)	56
Training Results in the Transbaykal Military District (A. Lizichev; ZNAMENOSETS, Aug 78)	60
Training of New Tank Personnel Described (M. Pechinin; ZNAMENOSETS, Aug 78)	66
Small Unit Airborne Tactical Training Examined (V. Kostylev; ZNAMENOSETS, Aug 78)	70
Work of Veteran Diver Recounted (N. Zhichkin; ZNAMENOSETS, Aug 78)	76
Development of Officer Training Policies Reviewed (V. Rodin; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Aug 78)	81
Methods of Attaining Good Discipline Discussed (V. Goncharov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Aug 78)	90
Civil Defense Training Activities at Tula Plant Described (A. Khorunzhii; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Oct 78)	102

INDOCTRINATION GUIDE FOR STRENGTHENING MILITARY DEFENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 78 signed to press
19 Jul 78 pp 75-83

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Skryl'nik, candidate of philosophical sciences:
"The Work of the CPSU in Carrying Out Leninist Ideas on Strengthening the
Country's Defensive Capabilities During the Modern Era"]

[Text] Political classes on this subject have been called upon to help fighting men understand more thoroughly the vital force of Leninist ideas about protecting the socialist homeland and their embodiment in CPSU policy which is directed toward strengthening the country's defensive might. A total of ten hours are devoted to the study of this topic. It is advisable to distribute this time as follows: two hours for a lecture (narration, four for independent work by the students, and four for a seminar (discussion).

During the lecture (narration) it is desirable to examine the following basic questions: 1. The party's concern for strengthening the economic foundations of the country's defensive capabilities. 2. The CPSU's activity in training and indoctrinating military personnel. 3. The improvement of party and political work in the Soviet armed forces.

When starting to talk about the subject, it is possible to point out that the Soviet state, to which Great October gave birth, has proclaimed from the very first days of its existence a policy of peace and the defense of the freedoms and equality of all peoples in order to counterbalance the imperialist policy of aggression, expansionist wars, the enslavement of other peoples. One of the first decrees of the Soviet state was the Leninist Decree on Peace adopted by the 2d Congress of Soviets on 26 October (8 November) 1917. However, world imperialism and domestic reaction took up arms against the republic of the Soviets and undertook a bloody campaign against it in order to take away the workers' and peasants' revolutionary accomplishments and restore the capitalist system in Russia. In the situation which took shape, the task of defending the first homeland in the world for workers and peasants with arms against the onslaught of international imperialism and the White Guards became the urgent task of the triumphant proletariat.

V. I. Lenin taught: "Any revolution is only worth something if it is able to be defended...." ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collection of Works] Vol. 37, p 122). To defend the accomplishments of October from domestic and foreign reaction, to disrupt imperialism's aggressive plans, to ensure peaceful conditions for the construction of socialism and communism in our country--the great leader assigned these tasks to the Communist Party and the Soviet people. Throughout the entire 60-year history of the Soviet state, the party and people have been faithful to these immortal precepts.

For the fourth decade now our motherland has lived and worked under a peaceful sky. The Soviet Union together with fraternal socialist countries is waging an active and consistent battle for the peace and security of people and the further relaxation of international tension. Quite a few successes have been achieved in this noble cause. However, there still exist and actively operate forces in the world who are trying to disrupt the relaxation process, who are urging on the arms race, who are creating new types of lethal weapons, and who are strengthening aggressive blocs. Under these conditions, as is pointed out in the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to the fighting men of the heroic armed forces of the Soviet Union on the occasion of their 60th anniversary, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are devoting constant attention to the cause of strengthening the country's defensive capabilities. They are seeing to it that our glorious armed forces have at their disposal everything necessary to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

1. The Party's Concern for Strengthening the Economic Foundations of the Country's Defensive Capabilities.

V. I. Lenin taught that to wage war successfully in defense of the socialist homeland, a strong and well organized economy is needed. During war, he emphasized, "the one comes out on top who has the greatest equipment, organization, discipline and the best machines...." ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 36, p 116). He pointed out: "In a modern war... the organization of the economy has deciding importance" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol. 34, p 194).

These propositions were convincingly proven during the Great Patriotic War. As is known, before the attack on the Soviet Union Hitlerite Germany had available a 1.5-2 fold greater military economic potential than the Soviet Union. Its military might relied not only on its own production but also on the industrial might and raw materials of many occupied states. However, despite, the temporary loss of an enormous amount of territory on which about half the country's population lived before the war, more than 60 percent of the coal was mined, almost 60 percent of the steel was smelted, and half the grain was harvested, the herculean efforts of the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party managed to organize military production at such a scale that it surpassed in all indicators the military production of the countries of the fascist bloc taken together.

This was unparalleled in the history of people's exploits and was based on the infinite selflessness of the working masses, the indisputable advantages of the socialist economic system, the unquenchable organizational work of the Communist Party which succeeded under incredibly difficult conditions in converting the rear area of the country into a powerful and strong base for the Soviet army. The party's scientifically based and far-seeing military and economic policy which relied on the advantages of socialism, progressive military and technical thought, and the high level of development of Soviet industry ensured the military and technical superiority of the Soviet armed forces over the Hitlerite invaders. Based on its mobilization capabilities, our economy was quite a bit more effective than the capitalist economy of fascist Germany which had been placed on a war footing long before the beginning of the war. Thus, for example, the production of weapons in the USSR was on the average more in a year than in fascist Germany, in airplanes it was 1.7 times greater, in tanks and self-propelled artillery--almost 2 times, in guns--more than 2 times, in mortars 5 times, and in automatic weapons--5 times. By January 1945, the Soviet armed forces exceeded the enemy in aviation--7.4 - fold, in tanks and self-propelled guns--2.8-fold, and in artillery and mortars--3.2-fold.

Under modern conditions, while carrying out the majestic plans of communist construction, creating the material and technical base for communism, and persistently struggling for the preservation of universal peace, our party and the Soviet people are at the same time taking into consideration the need to maintain the high combat capabilities of the armed forces and their equipping with the latest combat equipment and weapons. The international situation and the agitation of aggressive imperialist circles requires this.

When speaking on 31 May of this year at a ceremonial meeting in Prague, comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "Now a session of the NATO council has been held in Washington. Several of its participants, either on the way to the NATO conference or on the way home from it, visited New York and a special session of the UN. There, they spoke eloquent words about disarmament. But at the session of the NATO Council, they--as it is said without taking a breath--discussed plans for new military preparations designed for many years in the future." Based on official information, direct NATO military expenditures during the last four and a half years grew by 32.2 billion dollars. In the very near future the United States intends to increase its military potential in Western Europe considerably. J. Carter, the president of the United States, called upon NATO members to build up their military might further. Concerning the military budget of the United States, itself, it will reach record numbers-- 128.7 billion dollars-- during FY 1979 (it begins 1 October of this year).

China is talking with the most reactionary forces in the bloc. From the Pentagon to the Maoists--this today is the frontage of the forces trying to disrupt the cause of international relaxation. The widespread armed intervention of NATO countries in the internal affairs of Zaire once again corroborates how hostile the policy of the West's imperialist circles is to the cause of peace and the freedom of people.

The 25th CPSU Congress underlined the historic mission of the Soviet armed forces to be on guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to be a bulwark of universal peace. In the CC CPSU report to the 25th party congress, comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "During all these years the party has devoted the necessary attention to strengthening the defensive capabilities of our country and to improving the armed forces. We can report to the congress that in this area much has been done by us. The equipping of the armed forces with modern weapons and combat equipment has been improved and the quality of the men's combat training and ideological hardening has been increased. In the decisions of the congress it was emphasized that the 10th Five-Year Plan will be a period for strengthening the intensification of public production, for using more fully the capabilities of the national economy to augment the national wealth and to strengthen the economic might and defensive capabilities of the country.

Faced with the military threat which proceeds from imperialism, the Soviet state has been forced to improve its defenses. A love of peace and a readiness to give the necessary rebuff to any aggressor are fused together in its policy. In his report, "Great October and the Progress of Humanity," comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the CC CPSU general secretary and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "The Soviet Union is effectively concerned about its defense; however, it is not trying to obtain and it will not try to obtain military superiority over any party."

The policy of the Leninist party in the area of the country's defenses is extremely clear. The essence of this policy is that the Soviet Union has never armed for the sake of arming. Speaking to the fighting men of a missile unit in the Novosibirsk area, Leonid Il'ich emphasized: "Our successes in the military sphere--these are successes directed toward defending and protecting ourselves and our socialist friends from a possible aggression no matter where it might come from."

In accordance with the situation which has specifically taken shape on the world arena and also with the capabilities of our state, the party is strictly carrying out the decisions of its 25th congress about strengthening the country's defenses. The economic might of our motherland serves as its material and technical base. Now, the industrial might of the country of the soviets is almost 18 times greater than that which served for us as the basis for achieving victory during the Great Patriotic War. Today, the workers of our country produce in less than a month a social product equal in volume to production for all of 1936.

An integral part of the comprehensive economic progress of our country is the development of agriculture. The CC CPSU July (1978) Plenum, having examined the pressing problems of the party's modern agrarian policy, made decisions directed toward further increasing agricultural production and toward achieving the country's reliable supply of food and agricultural raw materials in order to raise the prosperity of the workers.

The development of the USSR's national economy has a peaceful nature. It has been entirely directed toward constantly raising the workers' prosperity and satisfying their material and spiritual needs. At the same time, the national economic plans also provide for the economic support of the country's defensive capabilities. The branches which determine technical progress--electronic power, the petrochemical industry, mechanical engineering, radio-electronics, and instrument making--are being developed at accelerated tempos. This has had and will have very important significance for the growth of our motherland's might and for improving its defenses.

Strengthening the material and technical base of the armed forces and improving their technical equipment are a material result of the military and technical policy developed by the party and government.

The party has made efficient use of the fruits of scientific and technical progress to ensure a qualitative jump in military affairs. Discoveries in the field of nuclear physics have led to the creation of missiles which have become a reliable system for delivering nuclear warheads to targets.

Based on the solutions to the latest problems in mathematics, cybernetics and electronics, there have arisen automated systems for controlling weapons and combat equipment, new ways and means for communications and reconnaissance, including radar and various remote control equipment, etc. The successes in chemistry have permitted the development of new explosive and incendiary substances and new materials possessing improved reliability, heat resistance and other qualities. The introduction of aviation jet engines and atomic power plants on submarines has caused a genuine revolution.

The old and traditional types of weapons and combat equipment have also changed considerably. Their firing, shock and maneuvering capabilities have grown significantly. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has declared: "We now have good equipment. However, as is known, we live in a century of scientific and technical progress where weapons are improved so swiftly that at times new models and systems are created not even in a year but in shorter periods of time. Stagnation in this area can be fraught with serious consequences. Our scientists, both civilian and military, must constantly think about and remember this.

The party's Central Committee and the Soviet government are continually concerned that the equipment, available power and combat capabilities of the army and navy are at a level which permits all the tasks facing them to be solved. Economics, science and technology in the Soviet Union are now at such a high level that we are in a position to create in very short periods any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace and socialism would like to rely. The Soviet armed forces are constantly on a level with scientific and technical progress. During the postwar period, military technology, the organizational structure of the forces, and the control and logistics system have undergone fundamental changes as a result of which the combat capabilities of the troops and naval forces have grown many times over. They have acquired a number of fundamentally new qualities.

The basis of the combat power of the Soviet armed forces is the Strategic Missile Forces. This is the youngest branch of our armed forces. The decision to create them was announced in January 1960 during the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this act, the wisdom and perspicacity of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and their fundamentally new approach to the problem of increasing the country's defensive capabilities under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution in military affairs were revealed with special force.

Under conditions where the United States had begun to rapidly create nuclear and then even a missile industry and to develop strategic nuclear forces, the only alternative to this aggressive course was the creation of its own nuclear missile weapons by the Soviet Union.

The Strategic Missile Forces now have in their armament intercontinental and medium range missiles capable of inflicting accurate and inevitable blows upon an aggressor no matter where he appears from. These are forces at constant combat readiness.

The Ground Forces are the largest branch of the armed forces in numbers and military composition. Today, the Ground Forces include modern arms and services: missile troops, artillery, motorized rifle and tank troops, and air defense troops. Their composition includes special troops: engineer, chemical, radio technical, signal, motor, road, and various rear area services, units and subunits.

The equipment and weapons which the Ground Forces have available permit them to inflict powerful strikes from the move. Increasing the number of tanks and infantry combat vehicles in the attacking echelon has increased the dynamics and rapidity of operations. The high maneuverability of units and large units makes possible the sudden shift of effort from one avenue to another and their rapid build-up where they will achieve the greatest success. The repeated increases in the power of units and large units have led to fundamental changes in tactics and in views on the nature of modern operations and combat.

During recent years, airborne forces which are intended for operations in the enemy's rear have been developed at accelerated tempos. Their armament includes self-propelled artillery and missiles, antitank and air defense systems, and reliable communications and control systems. Airborne equipment provides the opportunity to drop assault forces, weapons, and cargo under any weather and terrain conditions, day and night, on areas limited in size.

An important system for defending the state and the army and navy from enemy air strikes are the National Air Defense Forces. They are equipped with high quality systems for the surveillance, guidance and destruction of aerial targets, including a qualitatively new system--automated air defense missile complexes. The air defense forces include air defense missile troops, missile carrying fighter aviation, and radar troops.

The latest combat equipment and weapons of the National Air Defense Forces ensure the destruction of practically any aerial attack system at extreme ranges, at low and high altitudes and at supersonic flight speeds under any weather conditions regardless of the time of day or year. The air defense missiles used in the National Air Defense Forces ensure hitting the target, as a rule, with the first missile. The development and improvement of these forces continues based on the modern achievements of science and technology.

The Soviet Air Forces of today are a formidable and mighty branch of the armed forces. Possessing great shock power, they are capable of influencing the outcome of large-scale operations both in ground and on sea theaters of military operations. Missile carrying aircraft equipped with the most modern weapons, systems for detecting the enemy and controlling fire, and the latest navigational equipment now form the basis of the air force's power. Recently, new multipurpose aircraft with variable geometry wings and vertical take off and landing flying equipment have been created.

Thanks to the new equipment with which air force large units and units are equipped, aviation has acquired such high qualities necessary for successful operations as all-weather and year-round capabilities for combat employment and the capability to effectively overcome the enemy's air defense system, inflict strikes deep in his rear, ensure and maintain air superiority, and solve many other complicated tasks.

Our Naval Forces are a powerful missile carrying ocean fleet capable of reliably protecting the state interests of our country on the seas and oceans. It has available submarines, surface vessels, naval aviation, and other different systems which include the latest achievements of science and technology.

During the postwar years the appearance of submarines has been altered to the greatest degree. The introduction of nuclear power plants, missiles and other types of weapons, radioelectronics, and computers has permitted the creation of combat vessels which satisfy the requirements of modern warfare and which are capable of solving a wide range of tasks in any area of the world ocean.

Modern submarines equipped with the latest weapons, radio-electronic systems and flying equipment of various classes and purposes can effectively wage battle against a surface, underwater and aerial enemy. An important component of naval strike forces is naval aviation which is capable of hitting underwater and surface vessels and other highly maneuverable and small size objectives in the sea. The capabilities of naval infantry and coastal missile and artillery troops have grown.

Recently, the rear services of the Soviet armed forces have become qualitatively different. They are completely motorized and their operational capability, mobility and capability to satisfy the needs of the troops as greatly as possible have grown.

Thus, the re-equipping of the army and navy with the latest equipment and weapons which has been carried out during recent years, has immeasurably increased their combat power and created the material and technical pre-conditions for the crushing defeat of any imperialist aggressor. The guarantee of this is the constant growth in the scientific and technical potential of our state, the taking of leading positions in the world by Soviet science, and the readiness of each fighting man to always use the combat equipment entrusted to him with the maximum effectiveness.

2. The Work of the CPSU in Training and Indoctrinating Military Personnel.

The training of officer personnel capable of leading the troops and controlling units and large units under the conditions of modern combat has decisive importance in the men's mastery of modern weapons and combat equipment. The requirements which V. I. Lenin once announced for production leaders pertain in full measure to army and navy officers. He said: "In order to control, it is necessary to be competent. It is necessary to know all the conditions for production completely and precisely, it is necessary to know the technology of this production at its modern level, and it is necessary to have a certain scientific education" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 40, p 215). The great leader emphasized: "Only Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to consolidate socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible ("Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 37, p 200).

Thanks to the concern of the Leninist party, the army and navy now have at their disposal ideologically hardened and highly qualified officer personnel. Almost 100 percent of brigade and higher commanders and more than 90 percent of regimental commanders have a higher military education. More than half of the officers in the army and navy have a higher military and special military education.

When presenting the report, "60 Years in Defense of Great October's Accomplishments", Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, the USSR minister of defense, said: "Officer personnel play the main role in the formation of a Soviet fighting man and in ensuring the constant combat readiness of the armed forces. They are the basis--the backbone of the army and navy. The motherland has entrusted them with the dearest of its achievements--our outstanding youth whom they must train in military affairs, indoctrinate, and when it is required--fight. Soviet officers are honorably justifying this trust and are performing their military duty with a high degree of responsibility."

In attaching enormous importance to the technical equipping of the forces, the party always recalls V. I. Lenin's instructions that the main force in war has been and remains the individual and that the decisive factor in the combat power of the Soviet armed forces is the people. During the years of Soviet power a new type of fighting man--a fighting patriot, a fighting internationalist--has been formed who is infinitely devoted to the party and motherland. Like a sacred relic, he carries in himself the high moral qualities of the participants in the storming of the Winter Palace, the enthusiasm of the builders of Magnitka, and the valor of the defenders of Moscow and Stalingrad.

Along with this, new characteristics reflecting the present day and the present stage in communist construction have appeared in the character of today's generation of Soviet fighting men and in their spiritual make-up. Soviet fighting men--from soldier to marshal--are noted for this broad cultural outlook and high general and professional training. An unbreakable class unity, a community of goals, and bonds of friendship and military leadership bring together Soviet officers and soldiers.

Soviet officers are a reliable support for the party and government in the army and navy, the bearers of the class, revolutionary, and military spirit of the army and its combat traditions, and the gold fund of the armed forces. Through military councils, commanders, political organs and party organization and the entire officer complement, the party and government are exerting their influence on all aspects of the life and work of the troops. Officers instill in personnel a spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, and devotion to the ideas of communism; inculcate love for military work; train them in the art of mastering complicated military equipment and tactical principles for waging battle; form high moral, political and military qualities in the fighting men; develop conscientious discipline; and maintain strict regulation order in subunits and units and on ships. The entire meaning of the work of commanders, political workers, engineers, and technicians in the army and navy consists in the final analysis of constantly strengthening the combat power of the armed forces and raising their combat readiness.

Personnel in the leading element of the army and navy possess rich experience and are well prepared in an operational and tactical respect. It is characteristic that our officer corps has now been noticeably rejuvenated. Many officers, born after the end of the Great Patriotic War, now command troop units and ships.

The officers of the Soviet armed forces are worthy representatives of the working class, kolkhoz peasants, and the people's intelligentsia. They well understand what an economically important task has been entrusted to them by the motherland, the party and the government and are carrying out their duty honorably.

Considering the changes in military affairs that have taken place in recent years and the increased requirements on commanders, political workers, engineers, technicians, and all military specialists, the party is taking the necessary steps to train military personnel, and raise the level of their political, military and special knowledge. The command, political, engineer and technical personnel of the armed forces are trained in military academies and schools. In accordance with the instruction of the CPSU Central Committee, the training programs in military training institutes have been improved and the training process has been restructured in accordance with modern requirements. Many military schools have been converted into higher military training institutes. In connection with the incorporation of the institute for deputy company and equivalent subunit commanders for political affairs into the Soviet armed forces, a number of higher military political schools have been created.

The establishment in October 1974 of the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" in three classes was a manifestation of party and government concern for the defenders of the motherland. Today, many officers, generals and admirals have been honored with this high government award. On the whole during recent years thousands of officers in the army and navy have been awarded government decorations for successes in mastering new equipment, in training and indoctrinating personnel, and for courage and military valor.

Naval officers L. Zhil'tsov, Yu. Sysoyev, N. Usenko and others have become Heroes of the Soviet Union during peacetime. Today, a new generation of Soviet military sailors, who are performing difficult service on ocean expanses, is being reared based on their example. Irreproachable mastery of a combat vehicle helped Col V. I. Kuznetsov, a test pilot, to perform the heroic exploit for which he was honored with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The courage and high military skill of many other Soviet officers who are worthy successors to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War have been evaluated at their true worth.

The incorporation in November 1971 of the institute for warrant officers into the USSR armed forces was a testimonial to party and government concern for army and navy personnel. These have proven themselves reliable helpers for officers in the training and indoctrination of personnel and are making their own contribution to raising the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships.

The receptions in the Kremlin in honor of military academy graduates which have become a good tradition during recent years are a manifestation of party and government attention toward officer personnel. In the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to military academy graduates in June 1978 there was expressed the strong conviction that the detachment of graduates, just as the entire officer complement of the army and navy, should henceforth work with a sense of high responsibility at carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on strengthening our country's defensive capabilities.

On completing the account of the material on the second question, it is possible to draw the conclusion that, thanks to the party's tireless concern for the training of military personnel, politically mature, well prepared from a military and technical point of view, and broadly educated officers now serve in the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet people can be confident that officer personnel are justifying the trust shown in them and will honorably perform their duty to the beloved homeland under any conditions.

3. Improving Party and Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the CC CPSU report to the 25th party congress comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The establishment in the consciousness of the workers, especially the younger generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist

internationalism, of pride in the country of the Soviets, our motherland, and of a readiness to rise to the defense of the accomplishments of socialism has been and remains one of the most important tasks of the party" ("Mater-
ialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [25th CPSU Congress Materials], p 75).

Throughout the entire existence of the Soviet armed forces our party, in carrying out Leninist precepts on forming conscientious defenders of the socialist motherland, has devoted enormous attention to ideological work in the army and navy and to the moral, political and psychological training of personnel. The party is implementing the instructions of V. I. Lenin who taught that "where political work is conducted most carefully among the troops... there, there is no lack of discipline in the army, the better is its organization and spirit, and there are more victories" ("Poln. sobr. soch."Vol 39, p 56).

Party and political work, which occupies one of the most important places in military construction, actively affects the consciousness and feelings of Soviet fighting men by rallying them around the CPSU and mobilizing them to successfully solve the tasks facing subunits, units and ships. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" [A Small Earth] clearly shows the significance of party and political work and the role of the political worker at the front: "... if it is considered that the fighting spirit of the troops has always been recognized as a very important factor in the steadfastness of troops, then the political worker had been entrusted with a very critical weapon during the war years. He tempered the hearts and minds of the fighting men. Without this, neither tanks, guns, nor airplanes would have brought us victory."

The decisions of the 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses have contributed in an enormous way to increasing the effectiveness of party and political work in the army and navy. When emphasizing this thought, it is important to examine the steps taken during recent years by the party's Central Committee to further strengthen party leadership of the armed forces and to improve the quality of the political indoctrination of army and navy fighting men.

The 21 January 1967 CC CPSU decree, "On Measures To Improve Party and Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" plays a special role in this respect. Adopted 11 years ago, it still is a program document of the party and wholly preserves its guiding and organizing importance in the cause of improving party and political work in the army and navy and raising its effectiveness.

In order to strengthen party influence on all aspects of the fighting men's life, the CC CPSU approved in February 1973 a new edition of the Statutes for Political Organs and the Instructions for CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy. These very important documents, which define the principles for party construction in the army and navy, were brought into agreement with the decisions of the 23d and 24th CPSU Congresses, the 21 January 1967 decree of the party's Central Committee and other party documents

on the most important questions of organizational, party and ideological work. The qualitative changes which have taken place in the armed forces, the experience of party work acquired in units and on ships, and the transformation which has taken place at all levels of the party and political apparatus found expression in them.

The statute and the instructions accurately define the growing role of political organs and party organizations in the life of the army and navy and support the basic instructions of the party's Central Committee about organizing party and political work in the forces.

In December 1974 the Komsomol Central Committee and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy approved the Instructions for Komsomol Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.

In party and political work, just as in all the life of the troops, there has been a major turn during recent years in the direction of increasing attention on questions about raising the combat readiness of the army and navy and improving their ground, air and naval training. The enormous effort and material expenditures of the people on equipping the army; the conscientiousness, training and discipline of all servicemen; the art of the command element in controlling the troops, and many other items are concentrated in combat readiness, just as in a lens. Combat readiness is the crown of the men's military skill during peacetime and the key to success during war. The party and government require that the combat readiness of the army and navy always be at the required high level. This is the constant task of Soviet fighting men. It is also written in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The fundamental law of our country declares: "The duty of the USSR armed forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist homeland and to be constantly combat ready, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor." Thanks to the party's and its Central Committee's constant concern, party and political work, directed toward improving the combat readiness of army and navy personnel, has been raised during recent years to a new and higher level.

At the present time it is being directed even more purposefully to the steady shortening of the time to bring troops to a readiness to carry out assigned combat missions under complicated conditions and to having each fighting man master formidable weapons and combat equipment to perfection. A conscientious attitude toward overcoming the real complications in combat training is being instilled in personnel. Great attention is being devoted to the further strengthening of military discipline and the maintenance of firm regulation order in subunits and units and on ships.

The 25th CPSU Congress defined ways to further increase the effectiveness of ideological and indoctrinational work, and pointed out the necessity for a composite approach to the arrangement of the entire indoctrination task, that is, ensuring the close unity of ideological, political, work, and moral indoctrination considering the peculiarities of various groups of workers.

In conformity with army conditions the composite approach supposes the organic unity of ideological, political, military, and moral indoctrination of servicemen. Based on this, commanders, political organs and party organizations, in carrying out the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress, are achieving an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of all ideological and indoctrinational work.

This work is conducted in the armed forces by commanders, political workers, engineers, and technicians who are well prepared in an ideological, theoretical and military respect. At the present time, for example, the majority of army and navy political workers have a higher political education.

The unremitting attention of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all personnel is concentrated at the present time on studying and implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, on thoroughly understanding the propositions and conclusions stated by comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the CC CPSU report to the congress and in his other speeches and works, the requirements of the new Constitution of the USSR in the area of defending the socialist homeland, and the materials connected with the celebration of the 60th Anniversary of Great October and the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet armed forces. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's memoirs, "Malaya Zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Revival] reveal great possibilities for improving the ideological and political indoctrination of the fighting men and for perfecting the style of party work.

Primary efforts are being concentrated on forming in servicemen a scientific world outlook, ideological conviction, high political consciousness, and the moral, political and psychological qualities required for victory in modern combat. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, the USSR minister of defense, emphasizes: "Our advantage always has been and remains the superiority in the moral fiber and consciousness of the people and in their high socialist patriotism."

Now, the mass political, agitation and propaganda work in units and on ships is being directed toward thoroughly explaining to personnel the materials of the July (1978) CC CPSU Plenum, the report of the general secretary of the party Central Committee--comrade L. I. Brezhnev--to the Plenum, and the Plenum's decree, "On Further Developing the Agriculture of the USSR." Party aktivs and meetings, lectures and political classes, devoted to the decisions of the CC CPSU Plenum contribute to raising the political awareness of the fighting men and mobilizing them for the qualitative carrying out of combat and political training tasks.

In the army and navy there has taken shape and operates a harmonious system for the ideological and political training of officers, warrant officers, sergeants, petty officers, soldiers, and seamen. Officers increase their ideological and theoretical level within the Marxist-Leninist training system and participate in Leninist readings, lecture bureaus, theoretical conferences, political information exchanges, and other forms of ideological training. Political training has been organized for warrant officers. They are given lectures and reports on pressing problems in the life of the

country and army, on the international situation, etc. Sergeants, petty officers, soldiers, and sailors study in the political class system. Leninist readings, lectures, reports, discussions, topical evenings, oral magazines, meetings with old Bolsheviks and veterans of the war and work, showings of movies and television programs, excursions, and cultural trips are organized for them. Technical propaganda systems are being used ever more broadly in ideological indoctrination.

During recent years the physical opportunities for conducting political and indoctrinational work in units and on ships have grown significantly. A large number of televisions, radios, newspapers, magazines, and books are now in the armament of propagandists. Thus, in particular, during the years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan the number of televisions and radios increased 20-30 percent in the armed forces, the book fund of libraries reached almost 115 million volumes, and there were 1,250 copies of newspapers and magazines for every thousand servicemen.

As was pointed out at the end of last year during the all-army conference on improving the life of the troops, new requirements are being imposed today for soldiers' barracks. Even the name itself--barracks--is probably already obsolete. If such a word is still in general use, it is rather a tribute to the past. Today, a barracks has become a place of rest and cultural leisure for the fighting men and a center for instilling in them a communist community.

The party organizations of subunits, units and ships actively participate in the men's ideological and political indoctrination. There are now party organizations in almost 80 out of every 100 companies, batteries and equivalent subunits. In the Strategic Missile Forces 98 percent of subunits performing a combat watch have party organizations or party groups.

Army and navy communists are moving in the vanguard of the struggle for high combat readiness. With an ardent party word and personal example they are fighting to increase the quality of combat and political training and strengthen the discipline and organizational ability of personnel. More than half the members and candidate members of the CPSU had become excellent soldiers in training by the end of last year and 90 percent became rated specialists. Three-quarters of the subunits which communists head have only excellent and good indicators in all types of combat and political training. If one should analyze the composition of party replacements after the 25th CPSU Congress, the following trend can be discovered: progressive fighting men from the leading specialties--those who are on the main avenue of the struggle for the combat readiness of units and ships--are joining the ranks of the party. More than two-thirds of them are officers and warrant officers. Almost 80 percent of the communists who have joined the party during the past year serve in line units and on ships.

One of the most important directions in the work of army and navy party organizations is the leadership of Komsomol organizations. During recent

years, especially when preparing for the 18th Komsomol Congress, their militant energy has grown considerably and the activity and creative independent actions of army and navy Komsomol organizations have grown. They indoctrinate young fighting men in a spirit of faithfulness to the immortal Leninist precepts and the cause of the party and achieve the personal example of Komsomol members in training and work. During the years after the 17th Komsomol Congress more than 6,000 young fighting men have been awarded orders and medals and more than 100,000 army and navy Komsomol members have earned awards from the Komsomol Central Committee.

Using the entire rich arsenal of ideological work methods, commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are trying to have each serviceman thoroughly understand the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and the tasks facing the armed forces; examine correctly, from a class position, the events taking place in the country and in the international arena; and carry out conscientiously his constitutional obligations for the armed defense of our motherland. The greetings of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to the fighting men of the heroic armed forces of the Soviet Union in connection with their 60th anniversary says: "The most important task of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations is to instill in the personnel of units and ships high moral fiber and political vigilance, internationalism and combat cooperation with the fighting men of fraternal armies, faithfulness to the revolutionary and combat traditions of the older generations, and infinite devotion to the Soviet homeland." This instruction of our Leninist party and Soviet government is being successfully put into practice.

When completing the account of the material on the subject, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is persistently and consistently carrying out the precepts of great Lenin on defending the socialist homeland, and is constantly concerned about the growth of our motherland's economic, scientific and technical potential and about the preparation of military cadres and the training and indoctrination of personnel in the armed forces. The party's economic policy ensures the rapid growth of Soviet heavy industry which is the powerful base for the development of all branches of the national economy, for raising the prosperity of the workers, and for equipping the army and navy with the latest combat equipment and weapons.

Along with this, the party of Lenin is taking every step so that the powerful combat equipment created by the people and the firstclass weapons are in the hands of people who are hardened in an ideological and political respect, who are skillful, who have an excellent knowledge of their job, who are courageous, and who are capable of using this equipment and these weapons with the maximum effectiveness to defend the state interests of our motherland, the fraternal countries of socialism, and the historic accomplishments of Great October.

Soviet fighting men, thoroughly realizing the unity of the constitutional rights and duties of defenders of the motherland, are strictly carrying out the party's requirements concerning the maintenance of the army and navy at constant combat readiness. The advice, recommendations and instructions given by comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speeches to the workers and defenders of the Far East frontiers during his trip to the regions of Siberia and the Far East and also in his speeches at the 18th Komsomol Congress and at the ceremonial meeting in Minsk have been accepted by personnel as an order of the party and people to reliably protect henceforth the accomplishments of socialism.

During the hours for self-study the fighting men study V. I. Lenin's works: "A Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory Over Kolchak" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 39, pp. 152 and 155-156); "A Heavy but Necessary Lesson" ("Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 35, pp 395-397); "Speech on 'Red Officer Day' 24 November 1918", ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 37, p 200); "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112); the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Articles 31, 32, 62, and 63); the report of comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" (Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS, pp 22-25, 71-80, and 83); the report of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "Great October and the Progress of Humanity" (Politizdat, 1977); the speech of comrade L. I. Brezhnev during the 18th Komsomol Congress (PRA DA, 26 April 1978); the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, the USSR Minister of Defense, "60 Years on Guard Over the Accomplishments of Great October" (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978); and Chapter 5 of the textbook for political classes, "V. I. Lenin on Defending the Socialist Homeland" (Voyenizdat, 1977).

When preparing for the classes it is possible to use sheets 7-20 of the graphic training aids album, "The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the USSR Defenses" (Voyenizdat, 1976).

During the evening it is useful to arrange a showing of the newsreels and documentaries, "Our First Commandment", "Always Be on the Alert," and "I Serve the Soviet Union" and the film strips "Faithful to Lenin's Precepts" and "Always Be Combat Ready."

Literature for Propagandists.

1. V. I. Lenin. "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution" in "Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 30, pp 131-138.
2. V. I. Lenin. "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory Over Kolchak" in "Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 39, pp 151-159.
3. V. I. Lenin. "A Heavy but Necessary Lesson" in "Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 35, pp 393-397.

4. V. I. Lenin. "Speech on 'Red Officer Day' 24 November 1918" in "Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 37, p 200.
5. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112.
6. Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Articles 31, 32, 62, and 63.
7. L. I. Brezhnev. "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" in "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS, Politizdat, 1976, pp 22-25, 71-80 and 83.
8. L. I. Brezhnev. "Great October and the Progress of Humanity," Politizdat, 1977.
9. L. I. Brezhnev. "Speech to the 18th Komsomol Congress" in PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
10. D. F. Ustinov. "60 Years in Defense of the Accomplishments of Great October" in PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.
11. A. A. Yepishev. "The Party Is the Organizer of Our Victory," Voenizdat, 1976.
12. Partiya i Armiya, Politizdat, 1977, Chapter 6.

8802
CSO: 1801

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF VIGILANCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, 1978 signed to press
4 Sep 78 pp 3-8 LD

[Editorial: "Our First Precept--To Be On Guard!"]

[Text] The great Lenin, leader of the Communist Party and founder of the Soviet state and its armed forces, indefatigably reminded the victorious proletariat in our country how important it is constantly to maintain high revolutionary vigilance and readiness to rise at any moment to the defense of the socialist motherland. "The first precept of our policy," he said, "the first lesson...which all workers and peasants must learn is to be on their guard...." High vigilance is one of the most important conditions for successful socialist and communist building and our powerful weapon in the struggle against enemies. V. I. Lenin attached particularly great significance to strict observance of vigilance in the military sphere and repeatedly pointed out that "military discipline and military vigilance raised to the highest limits are essential" in the struggle against a strong and perfidious enemy.

Lenin's behests on vigilance are still in the arsenal of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and our army and navy. They are extremely important and topical under modern conditions, since the forces of imperialism, reaction and war are continuing to display ever-increasing activeness in the capitalist world.

The relaxation of international tension and the normalization of relations among states with different social systems, which have been achieved thanks to the endeavors of the Soviet Union, the socialist community countries and all progressive and peace-loving forces, do not suit certain influential circles in the West. The desire of the USSR and the fraternal socialist states to eliminate the threat of world nuclear war, to deepen detente, to make the process of its development irreversible and to halt the arms race are encountering resistance from forces trying to revive mistrust and brinkmanship in interstate relations, opposed to detente, maintaining hotbeds of tension and whipping up the arms race in an endeavor to achieve military superiority over the countries of socialism. "The enemies of detente and

disarmament," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "still possess considerable resources. They operate actively, in different forms and from different directions. Although the opportunities for imperialism's aggressive actions have now been considerably cut, its nature remains as before. Therefore the peace-loving forces must display high vigilance."

The continuing growth of the aggressive NATO bloc's military expenditure poses a serious threat to peace and the peoples' security. Last year the imperialist powers' chief military and political bloc directed against the USSR, the other socialist countries and the democratic and national liberation movements spent \$165 billion on military preparations. The NATO countries' military spending now constitutes approximately 55 percent of all the funds spent on military purposes in the world.

U. S. military spending is growing steadily. Whereas \$166.8 billion was set aside for this in the current fiscal year, \$128.4 billion has been appropriated for fiscal 1979, which begins 1 October 1978. But taking into account the military programs "hidden" in "peaceful" budget items, this figure rises to \$132 billion. It is planned to increase the Pentagon's expenditure to \$172.7 billion by fiscal 1983. The development and deployment in the United States of the new MX mobile ICBM's, the nuclear-powered Trident submarines equipped with ballistic missiles and the cruise missiles and the plans to create neutron weapons--a barbarous means for the mass annihilation of people--and to deploy them among NATO troops in West Europe cannot fail to put us on our guard.

By putting forward as a smokescreen slanderous fabrications about the "Soviet military threat" and maliciously distorting the purport of the peace-loving policy of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries and the essence of our defensive measures, imperialist politicians and propagandists are trying to cover up their truly dangerous and potentially aggressive actions--raising the arms race to a new level, building up military forces and saturating the international atmosphere with the poisonous fumes of fear, suspicion and enmity.

The actions of China's present leaders represent a serious danger to the cause of peace and socialism. Pursuing a great-power, hegemonist course, Peking is openly gambling on stoking international tension and uses any means to undermine the positions of the socialist community and of today's revolutionary, liberation forces. Seeking to gain access to NATO military arsenals, China's rulers are publicizing in every possible way their hostility toward the Soviet Union and the other countries of socialism and campaigning for an unrestrained arms race. This policy is all the more dangerous because it is supported by the most reactionary circles of imperialist states.

Insuring the defense of our motherland and of the achievements of socialism, the Communist Party and the Soviet state combine the indefatigable struggle for peace with all possible strengthening of the country's defense capability

and the maintenance of the armed forces' combat might at the proper level. Our policy combines love of peace and readiness to rebuff the aggressor. The Soviet army and navy resolve their most important and most crucial task--to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and be the bulwark of world peace.

The constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the high vigilance of personnel is one of the chief conditions for thwarting the aggressive plans of the enemies of peace socialism and democracy. Conscientiously fulfilling his service duties, seeking to scale more and more new heights of combat skill and striving for new successes in combat and political training and in socialist competition, every Soviet soldier makes the greatest contribution he can to fulfillment by the USSR Armed Forces of their sacred duty to the motherland, which, as the USSR Constitution points out, is to reliably defend the socialist homeland and to be in a state of constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

In the present complex international situation Soviet people and army and navy servicemen do not have the right to forget for one moment the fact that the imperialists and their accomplices, in addition to overt preparation for war, are conducting broad subversive activities against the USSR and the socialist community countries. In this secret war active use is made of economic, political and military espionage, various ideological diversions and slanderous anti-Soviet and anticommunist campaigns. It is known that the U. S. administration appropriates vast funds to maintain the intelligence apparatus. It also generously finances the activities of the subversive Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Spiritual poison is beamed to our country round the clock by several dozen radio stations of capitalist countries: Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Voice of Israel, Radio Vatican and others.

The enemies of socialism use scientific and cultural exchange, which has expanded in accordance with the Helsinki Agreements, and tourists for subversive activities. In 1976 alone the appropriate organs arrested more than 50 "tourists" who tried to bring anti-Soviet literature into the country. Imperialist intelligence services use various ways to send into the Soviet Union specially trained spies who operate in the guise of journalists, businessmen, sportsmen, diplomats and so forth. Earth satellites, powerful radio-monitoring stations and radar installations situated near our borders, ships, aircraft and helicopters are used for espionage purposes. Enemy agents have in their arsenal the most modern, diverse observation, photographic, sound-recording and bugging apparatus. Enemies seek to obtain information on our country's defense capability, on recent achievements in the sphere of war materiel and arms, on our armed forces and their mobilization readiness and on the state of combat training and discipline among personnel.

In gathering information of interest to them imperialist intelligence services gamble on morally unscrupulous persons from among our people. The court trials in July of traitors to the motherland and spies reminded us of this with fresh force. Inordinate self-conceit, vanity, envy, a desire for money-grubbing and moral unscrupulousness brought Filatove and Shcharanskiy to the most heinous

of crimes--betrayal of their motherland. These were not simply victims of delusion or people who had chanced to stumble who were in the dock, but criminals who knew perfectly well what they were doing. And Soviet justice gave them their just deserts. The fate of a traitor cannot be otherwise. The Soviet state must keep its secrets. The divulgence of state and military secrets is quite rightly regarded in our country as a heinous crime before the Soviet people and the socialist motherland, and is punished with all the severity of the Soviet laws.

In taking the oath of enlistment a soldier wears a sacred oath to be always prepared, on the orders of the Soviet Government, to come to the defense of his motherland, to be vigilant and strictly to keep military and state secrets. Be on your guard! This is what the Soviet people, the Communist Party and the behests of the great Lenin demand of the serviceman. This demand permeates all life in the army and navy and is an immutable law for all armed forces personnel. High personal responsibility for the motherland's security and for the defense of its borders and state interests and the constant vigilance of Soviet soldiers find expression in their strict observance of our laws and of the provisions of the oath of enlistment and military regulations, in discipline, in concern for the daily enhancement of combat training and strict keeping of state and military secrets and in implacability toward any manifestations of carelessness and complacency.

The vigilance of the personnel of our armed forces is founded on their high political awareness and their profound understanding of their responsibility for defending the achievements of Great October, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet state and the peaceful labor of their own people. Therefore the ideological and political training of servicemen and the shaping of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and communist conviction in them are always at the center of attention of military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations of the army and navy. Guided by the decisions of the 25th party congress and of the plenums of the party's Central Committee, by the CPSU Central Committee resolutions on ideological questions and by the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, they show daily concern for raising the quality and efficiency of the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political instruction of ensigns and warrant officers and political lessons with soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers. A comprehensive approach in ideological-educational work with personnel, as shown by the experience of many military collectives--for example, the nuclear-powered submarine commanded by Capt A. Kazakov or the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col B. Kravtsov--insures successful ideological influence on soldiers and on all aspects of their combat training, service, daily life and leisure, and promotes a close link between the political, military and moral education of servicemen and combat training.

To explain to servicemen the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the need to maintain at the highest level all-round readiness to decisively rebuff any aggression, from wherever it might stem, and to foster in them noble feelings of Soviet patriotism and proletarian,

socialist internationalism and burning hatred for class enemies--this is the chief way to enhance the soldiers' vigilance and their personal responsibility for the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, ship and the armed forces as a whole.

All forms and methods of propaganda and mass agitation work are aimed at educating personnel in the spirit of high vigilance. For this, extensive use is made of diverse technical propaganda means. Individual work plays an important role, as it is possible to have the most effective influence on a serviceman by knowing the level of his political maturity and the special features of his character. An individual approach to every soldier helps to develop high moral and combat qualities in him more quickly and to eliminate everything superficial and negative.

It is important to use experience of the Great Patriotic War in fostering revolutionary vigilance in servicemen. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev recalls in his book "Malaya Zemlya" how concern was shown for the keeping of military secrets in the war years: "'When will it be?'--soldiers, commanders and political workers would ask without adding the words 'the offensive,' because it was clear what they meant even without them. It was possible to answer with only one word: 'Soon.' The day and the plan of the offensive were kept in the strictest secrecy.... We forbade any correspondent whatever connected with the operation which was being prepared. An extremely restricted circle of people was involved in drawing it up."

It is the direct duty of all commanders--officers, ensigns, warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers--daily to combine the combat training of subordinates with their education in a spirit of discipline, executive efficiency and vigilance. A story about an instructive frontline episode during a lesson or an example from the life of one's subunit, unit or ship, skillfully chosen and utilized in a methodically correct manner, increases the lesson's effectiveness, as well as helping to fix the teaching material in the consciousness of those being taught and to shape the necessary moral and combat qualities in them.

Great opportunities for enhancing the vigilance of Soviet soldiers are disclosed in tactical field training sessions, on exercises and during flights, sea voyages and combat-training missile launches. The skills acquired by servicemen of operating under complex conditions are closely tied up with their ability constantly to remember the need for vigilance. Under no circumstances must radio operators violate the radio traffic regulations or allow any transmissions as an open text. Radar operators must strictly observe the radio discipline regulations. All servicemen are obliged to remember that the enemy is eavesdropping and that he has special, sophisticated equipment for this.

The maintenance of high vigilance and constant combat readiness is particularly important for subunits on combat duty--with strategic and antiaircraft missiles, interceptor fighters and other diverse materiel. However

complex the conditions, a soldier coming onto combat duty is called upon to be prepared immediately and successfully to fulfill a combat task at any moment. Soldiers on combat duty are essentially the first echelon of our army, whose duty it is not to allow enemies to take us unawares.

Efficient guard and watch duty is also an indispensable condition for the maintenance of vigilance. The regulations for garrison and guard duty point out that the performance of guard duty is the fulfillment of a combat task and demands of soldiers accurate observance of all the provisions of the regulations, high vigilance, unbending determination and initiative. It is not for nothing that our people pass on this saying from generation to generation: "Remember, sentry, your post is the forward line!" Careful selection of guard personnel, their training, party political work carried out during guard duty--everything must be fully directed toward educating soldiers in the spirit of high vigilance.

Internal service must also be organized efficiently in every subunit and unit. Persons of the daily detail and checkpoint duty officers are obliged not to deviate from the regulations by a single step. Strict observance of discipline, organization, regulation order and the regulations closes all loopholes for the enemy. Soviet soldiers serving outside the country's borders and on long sea voyages are called upon to display particularly high vigilance.

Military secrets are kept not only in safes. Any serviceman, whatever post he holds, knows a great deal: the unit's position, the subunit's strength, its organization and armament, what is studied on combat training exercises, how the unit is guarded, and so forth. Therefore a vigilant soldier is always on the alert and wary, does not hold official conversations where not prescribed, and does not forget vigilance when using the telephone and other means of communication.

The tireless work of commanders, above all, insures that vigilance and other essential moral and combat qualities are shaped in servicemen. The commander is always an example for subordinates. It is precisely his actions and deeds and his moral makeup that they emulate. And the more strictly and persistently a commander follows the regulation requirements and the higher his ideological and moral standards, the greater the influence he has on personnel. This is why it is so important to show constant concern fostering high moral and combat qualities in officers, ensigns, warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers, to seek to insure that they set examples of discipline, organization and vigilance and to strengthen their authority daily.

Political organs, party organizations and all communists are called upon to play and do play a considerable role in this. A principled approach to evaluating the true state of affairs regarding the training and education of the personnel of a subunit, unit or ship, businesslike criticism of shortcomings, the elaboration of specific measures to eliminate them--this is an important

condition for successfully resolving tasks of combat and political training, further strengthening military discipline and enhancing vigilance and combat readiness.

As experience shows, hushing up of mistakes, complacency and carelessness give rise to individual instances of blunting of vigilance, loss of official documents and indiscretion. Cases of thoughtlessness and violations of the regulations for the storage of official documents, correspondence and telephone and radio conversations must always receive a very sharp and principled evaluation by commanders, political organs and party organizations. One of the important directions in the activities of party organizations is to foster in every communist high personal responsibility for the fulfillment of his party and official duty and the desire to be a model of observance of vigilance for all personnel.

Komsomol organizations are the reliable assistance of commanders, political organs and party organizations in work on educating army and navy youth in the spirit of unflagging vigilance. And the struggle against carelessness and thoughtlessness is all the more implacable where constant concern is shown to improve party leadership of Komsomol organizations.

Officers' houses, clubs, libraries and other army and navy cultural and educational establishments also make a certain contribution to educating Soviet soldiers in a spirit of high vigilance. Readers' conferences, discussions of books and movies, visual agitation and much besides successfully serve this important cause. The army and navy press plays a big role in enhancing personnel vigilance.

Summer combat training is drawing to a close. Army and navy servicemen are persistently mastering first-class modern arms and combat materiel and the science of defeating a strong, well-equipped, perfidious enemy. Commanders, political organs and party organizations are improving their work style. The preparations for the Komsomol's 60th anniversary have become the most important content in the activities of Komsomol organizations. Successes in socialist competition and in the growth of field, air and sea skill are the worthy response of armed forces personnel to the concern of the party and the people for further strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet motherland and the combat might of our army and navy.

Addressing the personnel of a missile unit in the region of Novosibirsk, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the USSR Defense Council, said: "The party and the people are proud of the Soviet Armed Forces. I wish to express the confidence that you will continue to be in a state of constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor and will fulfill with honor your sacred duty to the people and to our great motherland." Inspired by this high evaluation of their military labor, the armed defenders of the socialist homeland--patriots and

internationalists--shoulder to shoulder with their comrades in arms--the soldiers of the fraternal countries of socialism--are vigilantly standing on guard over the creative labor of the builders of the new world and vigilantly safeguarding peace on earth.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil," 1978

CSO: 1801

ROLE OF COMMANDER IN ORGANIZING LOGISTICS EXAMINED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 12-14

[Article by Colonel-General I. Golushko: "Commander's Role in Controlling Logistics"]

[Text]

In all historical periods the timely provision of the forces with arms and supplies, including food, ammunition and fuel, the organisation of lines of communication and means of transportation, the rendering of medical aid on the battlefield, the evacuation and treatment of the sick and wounded, the repair of arms and other combat equipment, protection and control of the rear have always had a great influence on the course of military operations.

Realising the importance of timely and all-round logistical support for achieving victory, the best military leaders did their utmost to ensure not only a high training standard of the troops, but also their adequate armament and supply with food and other materials.

When the Soviet Army was being established during the Civil War the distinguished military leader Mikhail Frunze wrote:

"Unless the front is effectively supplied with all that is needed for the conduct of military operations, unless an accurate record is kept of shipments of military supplies, unless evacuation is organised, no correct rational execution of big military operations is conceivable."

As the art of war was developed, the role of logistics was enhanced, the scope and complexity of its tasks increased. New types of supplies and support and new services appeared. Military leaders at all levels had to devote more time and acquire special knowledge to organise an effective logistical system. In planning an operation or battle the commander had to formulate and assign missions to every one of the numerous logistical services, to specify them every day in the course of the hostilities and to coordinate the functioning of all these services.

This made troop control more difficult and complicated, and already during the First World War attempts were made by the armies of the belligerents to relieve the commander of specific missions of logistical support and to concentrate the functions of logistical control in the hands of a special officer. Thus, the Russian army introduced the appointment of chief of supply of the front, who was in charge of all the supply and support services.

Creative use was made of this experience in organising the Logistical System of the Soviet Armed Forces. As early as 1918 the Central

Supply Department of the Red Army was set up. The post of chief of supply was introduced at fronts, armies, divisions and brigades.

The principle of centralised logistical control was further developed during the Great Patriotic War. Independent logistical control agencies were introduced. The post of Logistics Chief of the Red Army, who was at the same time a Deputy People's Commissar of Defence, was instituted together with the appointments of deputy commanders for logistical support.

However, though the post of deputy commander for logistical support was introduced, the troop commander continued to play a dominating role in logistical control. As the one-man commander he was personally responsible for all-round support of his troops. This was quite understandable. As he directly controlled offensive or defensive operations, he alone could fully and competently determine the type and quantity of means needed for the conduct of combat actions. More than that, he alone could say how the means made available had to be distributed among the forces under his orders. In his memoirs the distinguished military leader of the Great Patriotic War Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov repeatedly pointed out that providing the troops with arms, ammunition, fuel and other supplies was the primary duty of the commanders and chiefs at all levels. In a foreword he wrote to a book he pointed out that the experience of the last war showed that, unless the forces were adequately equipped and provided with the necessary logistical support, they were unable to achieve the ultimate goals of offensive operations. Because of this, for instance, the Soviet armies failed to score proper success in the winter campaign of 1942 in a number of strategic directions and in the summer-and-autumn campaign of 1943 in the Western direction.

Soviet military art clearly determines the role and place of the commander and his deputy for logistical support in the complex function of supplying the materials required for combat operations. Taking into account the complex character and large volume of the work to be carried out by the logistical service of the front for an impending operation the troop commander tries to acquaint his deputy for logistical support as early as possible with the intention of the operation, the character and time of its execution. At the same time the deputy commander for logistical support must fully understand the intention, study the composition of the forces and weapons of the front, etc., to work out the practical measures of logistical support at every stage of the operation. Unless the de-

puty commander has this information the logistical services will be unable to accomplish the tasks and missions they have been assigned.

In the case of the Vistula-Oder Operation carried out in autumn 1944 the Commander of the First Byelorussian Front informed his deputy for logistical support 45 days before the attack on all questions with which he was concerned. He proceeded from the assumption that unless his deputy for logistical support was familiar with the main aspects of the operation plan, the logistical services would experience serious difficulties in coping with the volume of shipments, with the concentration and correct echeloning of ammunition, fuel, food and other materials.

Many other examples could be quoted to prove that the success of any operation largely depends on the concerted fruitful work of the commander, who works out the intention, and of his deputy for logistical support, who implements the intention as regards supply of materials.

An analysis of the main battles fought in the Great Patriotic War will show that, despite the justified limitation of the number of officers involved in work on the plans of operations, the deputy commander for logistical support had to be just as fully informed as the chief of staff on the intention, time and character of forthcoming operations.

The art of organising and controlling logistics is a vital aspect of modern military art in general. Stereotyped patterns and ready-made schemes cannot be relied upon in organising logistical support. It calls in every instance for concrete decisions based on the actual operational and logistical situation.

Precisely this kind of creative attitude to the organisation and control of logistical support in battle was one of the strong points in the work of eminent Soviet military leaders during the Great Patriotic War. It would be fair to say that no offensive operation was ever launched until, figuratively speaking, the red arrowhead on the operations map was provided with the necessary logistical support.

An example of concrete guidance of the Logistics Department of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War is provided by the decisions of the State Defence Committee and the orders of the People's Commissar of Defence. For instance, in 1943 there were irregularities in supplying the men with food on the Kalinin Front. The State Defence Committee held a special meeting on the matter which resulted in the issue of an order by the People's Commissar of Defence emphasising that "the

provision of military supplies is an extremely difficult and complicated undertaking and should be handled by the most experienced leaders and be regarded as one of the key responsibilities of the military councils of the fronts and armies."

The military leaders at all levels today bear special responsibility for the organisation of logistical support of the forces. This follows from the greatly enhanced role the logistical services play today in the context of scientific and technological progress, the development of industrial production, as a result of the introduction of new types of weapons, of the radical changes that have occurred in the structure and technical equipment of the Armed Forces and in the character of war and methods of warfare. The scope of logistical support missions has increased immeasurably. During the Second World War the daily requirement of various means per man amounted to about 20 kilograms. According to information which has appeared in the press outside the Soviet Union, this indicator has increased to 40 kilograms in peace-time and even to 90 kilograms in local wars. Or take the problem of supplying armoured, motorised and air force formations with fuel. Foreign experts have calculated that the daily fuel requirements have increased ten to one compared to the period of the Second World War.

All these factors require the commander to display constant concern for the organisation of the logistical services, and to take due account of their condition and possibilities in organising combat operations. The commander must be competent in organising control of the logistical services both in daily activities and in the conduct of military operations.

When a formation or unit has been assigned a combat mission, control of logistical services includes study of the intention, collection and appraisal of the information on the situation at the time of assignment of the mission, and adoption of a decision on matters of logistical support by the commander and communication of that decision to those responsible for carrying it out. Logistical planning in the preparation and in the course of military operations, timely assignment of missions to the logistical units and their preparation for the execution of these missions during the battle are of special importance.

In the course of combat operations control of logistical support includes collection of information on the operational and logistical si-

tuation, study and analysis of this situation, specification of the decision taken earlier, and, in the event of a radical change of the situation, adoption of a fundamentally new decision, issue of new missions to the executors, control over their fulfilment, guidance of the movement of the rear command post, organisation of signals, protection and defence of logistical establishments, restoration of combat efficiency and liquidation of the consequences of enemy attacks.

Of course, it would be wrong to assume that the commander must take decision on all these matters personally. In controlling logistical support the commander decides the main, key issues, assigns the mission to the logistical services as a whole, determines the general organisation, the quantities of supplies and the time by which they must be provided, the rate of consumption of supplies, the manpower and means made available to help the logistical services. It is up to the deputy commander for logistical support and the chiefs of the various services to organise the fulfilment of these missions and to take decision on particular questions concerning logistical support.

In the opinion of the author, special attention should be devoted to such questions as the organisation of work of the logistical services and control over them in the course of military operations, which today are distinguished by dynamic development, increased spatial scope, and the consequent possibility of massive losses and abnormal consumption of all types of material supplies. Taking this into account it is extremely necessary not only to provide the forces with ammunition, fuel and food, to organise effective technical and medical support as planned, but also to envisage broad manoeuvring of manpower and means of the logistical service to cope with unexpected tasks.

For this reason the commanders and their deputies for logistical support usually prepare the men and means for logistical support of battle even before the mission is assigned to them, and foresee possible manoeuvres in the event of unexpected missions, heavy losses or unforeseen interruption in the delivery of materials.

The level of troop control is an important indicator of the combat efficiency of the armed forces. This principle fully applies to the control of the logistical services. The logistical services are a vital element of the forces. Therefore, to improve performance in logistical control is an important component of the work of commanders and staffs.

TRAINING OF RADAR OPERATORS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 23-24

[Article by Engr-Maj Gen L. Grachyov: Independent Training of Radar Operators"]

[Text]

EFFECTIVE use of an antiaircraft guided missile complex largely depends on the performance of operators of target reconnaissance stations. The USSR Air Defence Forces have accumulated a wealth of experience in training operators. Let us consider their independent training.

To enhance the efficiency of such training, young operators are first acquainted with the operation principle of the indicator device and how the information is presented on it and the methods of measuring target coordinates. This preliminary stage is most important, because it is through the indicator device that the operator maintains contact with the target, watching its blip on the screen and studying its characteristics, e.g. location, direction, speed, manoeuvre, composition, presence of jamming, etc. Besides, the indicator device gives a clear idea of the station's efficiency.

When getting acquainted with target indication on the screen, particular attention should be paid to the image produced by multiple targets with different numbers of aircraft, and to the difference between a multiple target and a single one. For example, the shape of the target blip differs at every given moment even when the aircraft are in a compact formation. A well trained operator usually sees the difference by comparing blips produced by one and the same target at different moments of the aerial rotation. Moreover, he can estimate with sufficient accuracy the number of aircraft in a multiple target by the shape of the blip it produces on the screen, which is very important for the commander in taking a decision to give battle.

The operators thoroughly study the station's structural features which determine its resolving power. Each station having quite a definite resolving power according to the angular coordinates and distance, a multiple target may appear on the screen as a single one. So that the operators may better understand this, the instructor explains to them that the resolving power according to the distance depends not on the target's distance from the station, but on the station's parameters. This is used in defining a multiple target.

After such preliminary theoretical preparation the operators proceed to independent training. They learn to determine the linear distances between aircraft at which their blips will look either like multiple or single targets.

Prior to practising target tracking, determining the coordinates and flight parameters, the trainees are acquainted with likely mistakes and told how they affect target detection by missile guidance stations.

In measuring target coordinates chance mistakes are not improbable. One of their causes is inaccurate estimation of the beginning of a reflected pulse.

Training in reading out the coordinates begins with a single stationary blip. As the trainees improve their skills, they proceed to perform this operation with two, three or even more targets. After each training lesson the operators' performance is assessed, their shortcomings disclosed, and the assignment for the next lesson given. The instructor keeps a record for each operator, and enters the marks for each lesson in it.

Training in determining the coordinates of moving targets is carried out in the same sequence as in the case of stationary targets, i.e. first one, then two, three or even more targets are taken, their speed gradually increasing. At each stage of training in reading the coordinates the instructor sees to it that each trainee attains a certain speed before going on to the next stage.

When teaching the operators how to detect and track different targets, one of the subunits, for example, makes use of the following method. First there are lessons in the general course of radio detection and ranging during which the trainees study problems bearing on the specifics of work with those targets. The operators are given a detailed explanation of the method of calculating the maximum range of detection of aerial targets determined by the line-of-sight range. The calculations are first made for a hypothetic target reconnaissance station and then for the specific station served by the crew. The trainees learn by heart the data calculated for the specific station. Then they are shown how the target detection range changes depending on the closing angle. These calculations also are made both for a hypothetic and the specific station. The results of calculations are written down on special cards constantly kept at the operator's workplace to remind him of the interrelation between the target detection range and closing angles.

After such preliminary lessons the trainees proceed to training in detection and tracking of different targets. It should be noted that each lesson has its distinctive features depending on the type of the station, terrain, operators' abilities and proficiency. It should also be borne in mind that each trainee must achieve positive results in each lesson before going on to the next.

Training is considered completed if the operators can detect targets with the loss in range of not more than a small percentage of the estimated one and track targets faultlessly.

A more complicated kind of training for operators of target reconnaissance stations consists in detecting, tracking and determining the coordinates of high-speed pinpoint targets. Their detection presents the peculiarity that in one revolution of the aerial the target blip may appear at a considerable distance from the spot where it was detected during the preceding scanning. In the first stage of the operator's work with such targets it is necessary to calculate the distance covered by the target during one revolution of the aerial. Subsequently the training is intensified by increasing the number of moving targets.

Training in conditions of all kinds of electronic jamming is preceded by their studying. The instructor shows how they look on the indicator screen, at what speed they can move on it, how they affect target detection, tracking and determination of the coordinates. For instance, passive jamming is shown not in any spot of the screen but exactly where the enemy is likely to employ it. Then the instructor demonstrates how jamming travels on the screen with due regard for the average wind velocity, and how it disappears depending on meteorological conditions.

To make the material more convincing and obvious for the trainees the instructor calculates and shows them from what distance the enemy may employ jamming, and of what intensity, and how it will look on the indicator screen with different jamming densities. When practising target detection in conditions of jamming of different kinds and varying intensity, tracking targets in these conditions and determining their coordinates, the instructor sees to it that the jamming corresponds to the actions of the expected enemy.

Subsequently operators' independent training is made still more complicated. It includes detection, tracking and determining the coordinates of jammers and targets flying under their cover.

The main goal of operators' training is the acquisition of practical skills in work in a complicated air situation with all kinds of jamming.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1978

CSO: 1812

RADAR MAINTENANCE UNDER POOR CONDITIONS REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 26, 27

[Article by Eng-Col V. Revuka: "Radar Maintenance in Damp Climate Conditions"]

[Text]

Radar equipment is usually exposed to unfavourable atmospheric conditions in areas with sharp temperature fluctuations and a damp climate, and especially in maritime areas where the air is saturated with salt vapour. If no preventive measures are taken, this may seriously affect the radio and electric properties of some parts and consequently the capabilities of the radar station. Any delaying in taking such measures will have an adverse effect in the first place on the operation of moving parts, units and mechanisms.

Rainy seasons of the year give particular trouble to the personnel operating radar stations. Moisture penetrating parts and assemblies may cause undesirable effects of various kinds. Dielectric resistance and capacity decrease abruptly. Capacitor electric strength and insulation resistance become lower, and dielectric losses rise. Stray capaci-

tance appears in the inductance coil, in resistors a ruptured structure of the conducting element and broken contacts between the granules of the conducting layer are observed. These faults show up especially vividly in resistors with high resistance properties and a thin conducting layer.

High-frequency circuits may be disturbed, resulting in reduced receiver sensitivity.

If moisture penetrates into the waveguides of the receiving and transmitting devices this may result in mismatching the junctions between waveguide sections and those formed by aerials and also in a reduction of electric strength, burning of some parts, sparkling or clogging. If the electric energy conducted by waveguides is excessively high, some valves or magnetrons are likely to be put out of order. Electric losses rise and target detection range decreases.

If moisture affects electric motors, transformers, chokes or solenoids, insulation resistance deteriorates. This may lead to a difference in electrical potential between the turns of winding and not infrequently to the puncture of the latter.

Undesirable effects may also be caused by moisture entering collectors or mechanisms for the rotating, tilting or rocking of aerials. High-frequency and power cables affected by moisture lose their dielectric properties, which may lead to short-circuiting. The contacts of connectors, plugs and switches become leaky.

Radar equipment operated in maritime areas is also exposed to the influence of salt vapour contained in the air. Hence the possibility of fungi growth. Educting organic acids, these small growths cause unprotected metal surface to decay and rust. Some of the aerial parts may

be subjected to bulging, which usually leads to the flaking of varnish-and-paint coating. As a result radar aerials lose mechanical strength, their front-to-rear factor decreases and the radiation pattern becomes distorted.

If no timely preventive inspections are carried out corrosion usually affects joints of the antenna-mast device formed by cross-pieces, vibrators, reflectors or guys, those between waveguide sections or flanges and also butts formed by the surfaces of different metals.

Reliable operation of radar mainly depends on the set of preventive measures used.

To keep a radar station ready for action, the chief must train his subordinates to properly assess meteorological reports, determine the air humidity and perform daily inspections of the radar, concentrating on those devices, mechanisms, units and assemblies which are most subject to the action of moist air. Any faults detected must be removed immediately.

Before putting the radar in operation it is necessary first to heat it so as to check and specify its parameters and optimum operating conditions.

Taking local conditions into account, a radar chief must draw up a plan of technical inspections and regular maintenance operations.

Here are some recommendations which will be useful for radar crews.

The radar waveguide is considered most "sensitive" to damage. Therefore the condition of its protective cover must be checked thoroughly. When dismantling waveguide sections keep them intact. After all traces of carbon and rust detected have been removed, wipe waveguides with a gauze soaked in alcohol. When preventive main-

nance work on the waveguide is over, prepare the radar for operation. To begin operating a high-frequency generator in rated conditions, it is a good practice first to induce only some portion of high voltage in it. The waveguide being supplied with minimum electric power, the components of the high-frequency section will be heated until dry. Then the transmitter is switched to full power. Under these circumstances the possibility of waveguide puncture is excluded.

Considering the exceptionally harmful effect of dust in high humidity conditions it is necessary to remove it carefully from relay contacts and other parts of automatic equipment.

If oil leakage is detected in chokes, artificial lines, high-voltage and pulse transformers, this means that they are not tight and are thus affected by moisture. This fault must be removed and the oil replaced after it has settled and been filtered. It should be remembered that oil is hygroscopic. Therefore it is advisable to close oil tanks with metal cups filled with a dryer — granulated silica gel. The latter must be checked once a month. If silica gel changes its normal colour (dark blue or violet-dark blue) to pink, this means that it is saturated with moisture and must be replaced immediately.

To ensure perfect operation of collectors and electric motors, it is necessary to check regularly the condition of contact springs, electrodes and collector rings. If they are affected by moisture, the plan position indicator fails to display azimuth marks and blips. Collector rings must be protected with a thin layer of special grease. An excessively thick layer may influence the strength of the signal received from the collector because of the increased resistance between the ring and the electrodes. To remove

carbon, collector rings must be wiped with cotton waste soaked in alcohol.

Carbon and corrosion traces appearing on radio-frequency and power cables, connectors and cable boxes should be removed with gasoline. If necessary, connectors are dried and covered with a moisture-proof paste and the connections formed by feeders with insulating materials and oil paint. Local conditions permitting, it is better to lay cables in channels, covering them with soil, and to place cable boxes and junctions in special containers.

Varnish-and-paint coating is an effective means for protecting metals against corrosion. Metal surfaces affected by rust should be first cleaned with emery cloth, metal brushes, wooden bars or cotton waste and then with chalk mixed with mineral oil. Finally, the metal surface is degreased with gasoline. No kerosene or turpentine should be used in this case since these liquids are liable to contaminate the metal surface.

It is advisable to use chemical-resistant paints and varnishes to protect metals. Vinyl-perchloride enamels of yellowish-brown colour are most widely used for this purpose.

In areas with an excessively high content of salt vapour in the air, paint coatings should be covered once every 2-3 months with emulsion prepared experimentally from drying oil, gasoline and acetone. Such emulsions form protective films that cover cracks, thus neutralising the corrosive effects of the environment for 4-5 years.

A radar station will operate perfectly, all its parameters remaining within the specified limits in the most unfavourable operating conditions provided its units and assemblies are checked regularly and preventive maintenance operations are carried out in due time.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1978

CSO: 1812

MORAL, POLITICAL TRAINING OF SERVICEMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 34-35

[Article by Lt-General I. Mikhailov: "Moral Staunchness"]

[Text]

IN WAR THE MAN plays the decisive role. The course and outcome of a war as well as the degree of combat readiness depend on the moral state and political consciousness of the people and their army. That is why today, when modern means of fighting are used, the moral staunchness of the soldier is of particular importance.

In his teaching on the defence of the Socialist Motherland V. I. Lenin substantiated the principles of the Soviet servicemen's education and its class character. He stressed that if they are convinced of the rightness of their cause, if they are conscious that they are fighting for lofty ideals, for the working people's rule and happiness, this will raise their spirits and help them overcome incredible difficulties, filling them with the desire to show moral staunchness, mass heroism and self-sacrifice.

The essence of a purposeful educational work in the army is to develop in the servicemen a constant readiness to engage the enemy, to endure all hardships in battle and to gain victory; to form in them the necessary combat qualities, such as courage, staunchness, gallantry and readiness for self-sacrifice. This work is based on moral steeling, political education and psychological training.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, moral and political education and psychological training are closely connected and interdependent aspects of a single process. However in this unity the first two aspects are most important because their primary purpose is to form communist convictions in officers and men and to develop their Marxist-Leninist outlook, which will enable them to grasp the essence of modern warfare, its reasons, class character, goals and consequences and to realise more deeply their patriotic duty to defend their Socialist Motherland.

The Soviet fighting man has an unshakable belief in the righteousness and vitality of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the policy pursued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the inevitable victory of commun-

nism. These convictions impart a deep social meaning to his entire activities, giving rise to a firm motivation for his conscientious attitude towards his military duties. His high ideological maturity helps the fighting man to subordinate all his powers to one single goal — victory over the enemy.

Moral and political training, the main link in which is political study and ideological steeling, enable Soviet servicemen to realise that the state interests and aims are also their own. As a result officers and men form ideals acting as an incentive in their practical activities and develop communist and moral principles of conduct.

The experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces shows that a soldier with firm ideological convictions can not only visualise his ideal but is psychologically ready to defend it. This means that he is both physically and morally prepared to fulfil his military duty. Such a soldier will not waver in the face of a mortal danger and in a tense moment he will be ready to sacrifice his life consciously. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) the Soviet fighting men showed numerous examples of mass heroism, courage, bravery and selflessness. Surrounded by the enemy in a critical situation they would blow themselves up with the last grenade and crash their burning aircraft or tank into concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment. Nearly 300 fighting men followed the feat of arms accomplished by Private A. Matrosov who closed with his chest the embrasure of an enemy fire emplacement. Heroism was also displayed by whole units and formations.

Deep ideological convictions contribute immeasurably to the psychological stability of a soldier, which is of particular importance in modern warfare. Modern armed struggle presumes that each soldier must prepare himself for its harsh ordeals in advance. That is why combat training and political education in the Soviet Armed Forces are aimed at mobilising all the men's moral resources, making them staunch psychologically and ready for resolute and decisive action in battle.

Given the scientific-technological revolution in the military art, the moral staunchness of a soldier mainly depends on the psychological compatibility of all the members of the crew, team or subunit, their mutual replaceability, teamwork, etc. A high level of military, technical and special training and professional skill increase the soldier's self-confidence and his reliance on his weapons and combat equipment.

A fighting man's moral staunchness is characterised by the following most important features:

- high psychological qualities ensuring success in fulfilling military duties;
- a moral and psychological state of mind promoting the fulfilment of a concrete mission;
- readiness to solve any unexpected problem arising from practical activity in a complicated situation and the ability to respond quickly to any surprise.

Moral-political and psychological steeling does not exist as an independent kind of training in the Soviet Army and Navy. It is implemented by the entire system of combat training, political and military education and also by various ideological, moral and organisational measures. The purpose of political education is to make the servicemen proficient in Marxist-Leninist theory and thus to teach them how to think and act correctly, realising their role in the defence of their country.

The political education of servicemen is supplemented by their moral steeling. This is ensured by the everyday routine of army life and also by firm military discipline, perfect organisation and order. The order prescribed by the Regulations and scientifically substantiated control of military activities make it possible to create a congenial atmosphere of comradely and principled relations, mutual confidence and optimism in military collectives.

Besides developing military skill, combat training nurtures in the personnel high moral and combat qualities such as courage, readiness to give mutual aid, and so on. To cultivate the men's ability to switch over quickly from peaceful to combat conditions, the regular rhythm of army life is combined with marches, firing practice, missile launching, etc. Field exercises, training cruises and flights serve as a test for checking not only the men's professional and combat skill but also their moral staunchness and will power.

Every properly organised and methodically correct exercise improves the men's professional skill and solves simultaneously the problems of psychological training. During these exercises the officers and men grasp the real character of modern battle, develop their psychological stability including such qualities as resolve,

firmness, bravery, persistence and the ability to take a reasonable risk. To this end the situation at the exercises closely resembles real battle to make the men strain their moral and physical strength to the utmost.

Special psychological training also plays an important role in the educational process. Its purpose is to develop the men's emotional and volitional stability and to improve their memory, attention, keenness of observation, poise and self-control.

For instance, to develop flexible thinking, which is especially important for command personnel, the problematic situations created during field exercises envisage the possibility of various decisions being taken in conditions when time is strictly limited, the situation is dynamic and physical strain is high. Such training methods as simulating combat situations, tanks driving over the personnel or overhead firing are widely practised in the forces. It has also been proved useful to make use of special chambers or trainers which make it possible to simulate such effects of battle as uncertainty, physical overstrain and also to check the servicemen's psychological staunchness and help them develop firm volitional qualities.

All this enables the men to get rid of such bad habits as shirking responsibilities, lack of self-confidence, doubt. They learn how to make the utmost use of their knowledge and experience, of the capabilities of combat equipment and how to withstand prolonged physical and psychological strain without losing the will to win.

The Party and Komsomol organisations greatly contribute to forming high moral staunchness in the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Using various forms, methods and means of ideological work they influence the men's consciousness and cultivate devotion to their country.

Much attention is paid in the Soviet Armed Forces to selecting the most suitable men for this or that specialty, taking into account their physical and psychological peculiarities, professional inclinations, character and temperament. This allows military units to be provided with men most capable of handling weapons and combat equipment effectively.

The moral staunchness of Soviet servicemen is developed in their combat training and political education and also as a result of special measures taken during the daily routine of army life. So, the whole process of communist and military education is directed at making the Soviet soldier a staunch defender of socialism, peace and the peoples' security.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1978

CSO: 1812

IMPORTANCE OF COMBAT COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 38-39

[Article by Maj-General L. Korzun: "An Important Factor of Success"]

[Text]

SUCCESS in modern warfare can be achieved only by joint efforts of all forces and weapons committed to action on the basis of their close and continuous cooperation and the fullest possible use of their combat capabilities.

What is cooperation? The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia answers this question as follows: "Cooperation means actions of subunits, units and formations of different fighting services, arms, naval forces and special troops coordinated according to tasks (objectives), directions, lines (areas) and time in the interests of achieving the general aim of a battle and operation."

As the armaments, organisation and character of combat actions changed the methods of cooperation were developed and perfected. The rapid development of weapons in the 20th century radically changed the scale, character, content and forms of cooperation.

The appearance of aviation led to the creation of the air force. The necessity of fighting against means of air attack determined the emergence and development of the air defence forces.

In the First World War tanks were used for the first time. And in the Second World War tank forces, as a fighting arm, became the main

strike power of the belligerent armies. Various antitank weapons were rapidly developed.

The advent of airborne troops made it possible to organise combat actions in a considerably greater depth, and this in turn demanded an increase in the scales of cooperation.

The theory and practice of cooperation received its fullest development during the Second World War. In the Soviet Armed Forces the main attention was paid to artillery, aviation and engineer support for tanks and infantry launching rapid attacks so as to quickly capture strong points of the enemy's first defence line and energetically press home the attack in depth.

In preparing operations the problems of cooperation were thoroughly worked out at tactical exercises on terrain resembling as closely as possible the area of forthcoming actions and also at specially organised commanders' and staff exercises.

A typical example of organising cooperation is the work of the commander of the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps while preparing the Nikopol-Krivoi Rog operation in January 1944. Having eight days to organise the battle, the corps staff established close liaison with the 8th Guards Army's infantry formation commanders.

In the course of joint work on the spot they coordinated and defined: the means of mutual communication and personal contacts; places of control posts, time and order of their movement; lines from which to send the corps into the gap; zones, routes of advance and times of departure; order of passing through the friendly infantry formations' positions. Much attention was paid to covering the commitment to action of the mechanised corps by artillery fire of infantry formations. Its fire missions for the period of artillery preparation and support of the attack of tank (mechanised) units were precisely defined. The method of covering the corps by a combined-arms air defence system was coordinated and signals of cooperation were established.

Such an all-round organisation of cooperation ensured the corps success in this operation.

An important characteristic feature of the organisation of cooperation in tank (mechanised) corps was that they had to be in constant readiness to act in a direction not envisaged by the battle plan. This required of the commanders and their staffs the ability to coordinate the units' and formations' efforts quickly and precisely. The actions of the 1st Tank Corps in the East-Prussian operation in January 1945 was an instructive example of the skilful organisation of cooperation at short notice. The corps was to advance with the 11th Guards Army with which close cooperation was organised. But the situation which developed during the operation forced the front commander to send the 1st Tank Corps into a gap in the zone of the 39th Army. The corps commander had only six hours to change the battle plan. Nevertheless the mission was successfully carried out.

Strategic operations of groups of fronts carried out according to a common concept and plan became a new form of armed struggle in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Major formations and formations of different fighting services and arms took part in them. The use of large partisan forces and naval forces (in maritime areas) played an important role in many of these operations.

In analysing the course of combat actions of various operations during the Great Patriotic War we can note the importance of a close connection between tactical and operational, operational and strategic cooperation. Among the most important factors of success in the of-

fensive operations in 1943-45 were: the new method of artillery and air offensive; the massive use of major mechanised, tank and air formations and their skilful cooperation with combined-arms armies in strategic operations; the radical improvement of the preparation of operations and methods of troop control.

Foreign military theorists had to admit the high skill of the Soviet Command in organising and effecting cooperation at all levels during the Great Patriotic War. The British military historian Liddel Hart wrote that the successive blows on various sectors of the front; the temporary cessation of the advance in certain directions when it had slowed down in the face of growing enemy resistance, and the passing over to the offensive in another direction; the coordination according to the objective of every blow dealt to ease a subsequent one; the dealing of all blows in close cooperation and linked in time and space forced the German Command to transfer its limited reserves hastily to where a blow was dealt and at the same time restricted his possibilities of bringing up reserves in time to threatened sectors of the front. As a result the Germans were deprived of freedom of action while their reserves decreased catastrophically in numbers. These tactics on the part of the Russians led to a general paralysis of the German war machine.

The Allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition also had certain achievements in the sphere of cooperation, for instance, in landing large amphibious forces. The creation of Commands in theatres of operations with precisely defined functions and rights was an important step forward in ensuring control of allied groupings and maintaining cooperation.

Today, the role of cooperation at all levels has grown considerably due to the rapid development of the means of armed struggle and the increased scale and dynamism of combat actions. Well-organised cooperation makes it possible to employ each fighting arm taking into consideration its strong and weak points.

Battle orders and operational formations of forces are nowadays more complicated, the number of their elements has increased, requiring more precise cooperation between them.

The experience of local wars has proved that even tanks need the support of other fighting arms despite their high fighting power.

As is known, the cooperation is organised in the interests of those subunits, units and formations which carry out the main missions in the course of combat actions. It must be continuous and flexible in the course of a battle (operation). Even a short disruption of cooperation decreases the strength of a blow at the enemy, and if the disruption is considerable, it will lead to disorganisation in the actions of troops and decrease their combat capabilities.

The initiative of subordinate commanders is especially important. In all cases of disruption of cooperation they must strive to establish communication with their neighbours and the senior commander and mutually coordinate actions without waiting for any special instructions. This demand is closely connected with the demands of the principle of combat activity.

The Soviet military art, using the rich experience of the Soviet Armed Forces as a basis, has worked out a streamlined theory of cooperation and methods of organising and implementing it in a battle or operation.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1978

CSO: 1812

REVIEW OF BOOK ON SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 78 pp 48-49

[Review by N. Khlynov of book entitled "Sluzhu Sovetskому Soyuzu" (I Serve the Soviet Union) by a group of authors]

[Text]

In a book entitled "I Serve the Soviet Union,"* the Soviet Army and Navy are shown in an artistic-documentary photo genre.

In "A Word to the Reader" the authors of the publication underline the great significance attached by V. I. Lenin to the photograph as a document of history. Looking through photo stories about revolutionary events in Petrograd in October 1917, V. I. Lenin noted that history can be written well with a lense.

The first chapter of the book "Armed Forces of the Land of Soviets" gives brief information on the history of the different arms of the Armed Forces, their defence significance, contemporary degree of material equipment and combat capabilities, and shows the men who handle this equipment.

The section "Strategic Rocket Forces," contains illustrations of missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads of different power and having a large radius of operation. The dates given in the book testify to the short historical periods during which this fighting service has been developed. The missilemen free from complacency and carelessness are in constant combat readiness for resolute actions.

The unity of modern combat equipment and its master — the Soviet fighting man — is reflected in the chapters: "Land Forces," "Air Defence Forces," "Air Force," "Navy," "Airborne Troops," "Railway Troops" and "Logistics of the USSR Armed Forces."

The chapter "Exercises and Manoeuvres" recalls memorable episodes from the exercises "Dnepr," "Dvina," "Okean," "Kavkaz," "Sever" showing the actions of the fighting men in conditions closely approximating real ones.

"Strengthening and perfecting the Army and Navy is a complicated, all-embracing creative process in which there is not and cannot be any room for stagnation. What was new yesterday becomes a thing in the past today. That is the essence of the dialectics of the art of war," said Marshal of the Soviet Union F. D. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR. These words, expressing one of the demands of the Soviet military doctrine, are deeply rooted today in the consciousness of the Soviet Armed Forces' personnel.

As we know, new weapons exert a decisive influence on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. They have led to serious changes in all fields of military art, organisation of the forces, forms and methods of combat actions. The requirements of combat, physical and psychological training of the personnel, their moral and political qualities have been enhanced. The leitmotiv of the book "I Serve the Soviet Union" is the perfection of combat readiness of Army and Navy personnel. This is also illustrated by the photographs published in the book.

The photos recording meetings of the fighting men with veterans of the October Revolution, Civil and Great Patriotic wars are very stirring. In response to the intri-

* "I Serve the Soviet Union." A group of authors. Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1978 (in Russian).

gues of the aggressive forces of imperialism, the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces are increasingly determined to fulfil their sacred duty to the people — to reliably defend the Socialist Motherland, to be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing that any aggressor is instantly repulsed. The title of the book vividly expresses this determination.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1978

CSO: 1812

GROUND TRAINING PROCEDURES FOR AIR CREWS DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
30 Jun 78 pp 8-9

[Article by Gds Lt Col A. Osipenko, military pilot first-class: "Independently to the Model"]

[Text] Independent work occupies an important place in the system of ground training of flight personnel for the performance of flying missions. A special part of the workday is set aside for it. And this is perfectly natural, because, as experience has shown, if a pilot or any other crew member has not grasped the essence of a forthcoming mission, has not worked it out in detail and has not fixed in his mind the procedure for the performance of all of the flight elements, then no lectures, no briefings and no other measures will help him to perform the assigned mission well.

The documents governing flight work require that no pilot and no crew member, regardless of his position, military rank or work experience, be permitted to fly without the necessary training and without verification of his preparedness to fly by the appropriate commanders. This requirement has been advanced by life itself. The fact is that under today's conditions those large tasks facing the airmen cannot be accomplished in a routine manner. They require creative comprehension, a search for new and original solutions, and logical consummation, especially in a complex tactical situation.

The existing methods used in the independent work of aviators, however, does not always provide for the quality execution of assigned missions. Supervisory personnel of our unit (chast), for example, analyzed the errors and deviations made by the crews throughout last year. The conclusion was not a comforting one. More than half of the errors were committed by supervisors or crews flying with an instructor. First-class pilots committed half of all the deviations. Why is this the case? Does the right to make errors really increase with an increase in skill? After all, pilots with a lower skill level constantly performed new assignments, while the first-class pilots, as a rule, perfected their skill in the performance of missions already covered. It would appear that those who are assimilating a new type of training would commit the most errors and deviations. It is just the opposite in this case, however.

The analysis showed that one of the reasons for this was nothing other than a relaxation of attention to the quality of independent flight training on the part of supervisory flight personnel. A first-class pilot and deputy squadron commander, for example, once achieved the required angle for attacking a low-altitude aircraft during take-off, for example. He had the impression that the elevator was not performing effectively. The take-off was halted as a result. It was revealed during the critique that the pilot had neglected his independent work and had counted entirely on his experience. And this is the logical outcome. The less an airman works independently the greater the probability of deviations.

Some commanders unfortunately feel that it is a fairly simple matter to organize the independent training. It is enough to allocate the space, to designate the time and indicate the literature. But how efficient is such training? And in general, how much time does a pilot require in order to fully prepare for flights in the area of the airfield, let us say, and involving exercises already mastered?

Every airman knows that the extent and substance of independent training depend on the nature of the forthcoming missions, the conditions for their performance, and the training level of the crew. And no matter what, experience has shown that a crew which has long since mastered this type of combat training requires at least two hours to prepare for a simple flight using the landing systems. Is this a long time? Hardly. Let us take a look at all that crew members have to do in order to be thoroughly prepared for a flight, not just in words but in fact.

During independent training the flight personnel study the nature of the flight assignment and the sequence for its performance; they study the methods involved in performing the individual elements of the flight, possible errors and actions to be taken to prevent or eliminate them; they review questions of practical aerodynamics and the specific operational features of the aircraft equipment, those pertaining precisely to the given assignment, and special situations which may arise during the flight; they study the communication and radio engineering equipment and its arrangement, reserve airfields, the patterns for descending and approaching for a landing there, the radio-exchange procedure, safety measures, what action the crew is to take in special circumstances, and communication and interaction procedures within the crew, as well as the rescue equipment; they prepare charts and flight documents; and review the points in guiding documents defining the regulations and the procedure for performing an assignment as applicable to the forthcoming circumstances.

It is apparent that a great deal of work must be done and that the organization must be carefully thought out. Naturally, preparations for a new exercise, not performed previously and involving tactical use in a complex tactical situation require a great deal of time and energy. The result of independent training should be a detailed model of the crew's performance of the mission and of the actions of each crew member.

When organizing independent training the commander determines its nature, extent and duration. It is expedient to perform this work under the supervision of the immediate commanders, who must possess good professional knowledge and methodological skills in the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

Experience has shown that this is far from a simple matter. This is why the purposeful training of instructors must not be performed occasionally, but systematically and strictly according to plan. Supervisory flight personnel should assimilate thoroughly in special classes the requirements laid out in documents defining flight work procedure and rules and the duties of those in charge in the organization of combat training, be able to properly organize ground and flight training in a detachment and squadron, and know the methods used for conducting preliminary and pre-flight training in the subunit, performing flight assignments and conducting training exercises in piloting and combined trainers.

It requires at least two days of planned exercises and systematic independent work to study all of this. In addition, certain important problems are best raised in seminar classes conducted for squadron instructors twice a year. Good results are also produced by the special classes conducted quarterly for all supervisory flight personnel, according to a plan compiled by the methods council (with monthly adjustments made for the specific missions being performed).

An important area for improving the independent training of crews lies in a creative attitude toward it on the part of all flight personnel and a search for the optimal amount of training and for new techniques and methods. In order to make the independent work performed by the crews on the day of preliminary preparation productive our unit conducts advance classes on the exercises and tasks scheduled for the following month. There is no question that the level of independent training of the crews has improved as a result, since many of the problems have already been studied and it remains only to define precisely one's work with respect to the assigned mission.

The independent training of crews should be planned and organized in advance with a list of literature, necessary models and developments. It is desirable that lists reviewed in advance in the methods council and approved by the commander be available in each detachment. The lists are naturally corrected when additions must be made. For this purpose the deputy unit commander for flight training enters any changes in the reference list and sees to it that obsolete instructions are not used.

Before the independent training is begun the squadron chief of staff assembles all of the necessary aids, textbooks and other literature where the independent training is to be conducted. After this the independent training is carried out under the supervision of commanders and chiefs according to a preliminary training plan in which the squadron commander indicates those responsible for monitoring the work and assisting the crews. The planned nature of independent crew training makes it considerably more effective.

It is expedient to group the crews by categories in the unit preliminary training plan: crews which are members of detachments; supervisory personnel up to the deputy air squadron commander inclusive; and supervisory personnel from the air squadron commander on up. The crews of detachments operating according to a time schedule are given the most time for independent training. The time schedule should take into account all of the elements performed, from the crew's assumption of their positions in the cockpit to their exit from it, and the time required by the crew to study those elements and possible special occurrences for the different phases of the flight.

The crew's flight program is compiled on the basis of this work, the program requiring no more than 25 minutes.

It is naturally impossible to find a single formula which would solve all of the problems occurring in the training of flight personnel. The set of methods which I have discussed, however, has produced perceptible positive results. The level of air training of our crews has risen markedly, and the number of errors and deviations has dropped. This is further confirmation of the fact that properly organized independent training of the personnel is a reliable means of proving the effectiveness and quality of combat training and flight safety.

11499
CSO: 1801

ORGANIZING ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OF AIR CADETS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
30 Jun 78 pp 28-29

[Article by Eng-Lt Col N. Sukhochev and Eng-Col I. Sherstobitov: "Today, An Apprentice — Tomorrow, An Engineer"]

[Text] On-the-job training is the most complex type of training process with respect to organization and methods. The fact is that all the trainees in the course are involved in practical work on the aviation equipment simultaneously (which is not true of practical classes for the other types of training). And it is set up under actual working conditions, without the usual conveniences of a laboratory type of situation. Furthermore, on-the-job training and practice involve travel and adaptation of the trainees to new conditions.

All of this places great demands on the organization of on-the-job training and the preparatory methods used. The experience of the staff of professors and instructors at the Riga Higher Military Air Engineering School imeni Yakov Alksnis has confirmed the fact that the objective of on-the-job training can only be achieved if each workday is carefully thought out and planned, if the forms of control and record-keeping are defined and explained to each cadet and student at the proper time (especially in the case of individual on-the-job training). We therefore devote a great deal of attention to methods support for these classes and to the summarization and dissemination of the progressive experience of the best methods experts among the officers — Engineer-Colonels A. Glazovskiy and V. Plyamovatyy, Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel F. Ar'kov and others.

Scientific methods seminars are conducted at this school each year. The results of on-the-job training are discussed and ways of improving it are defined at these seminars. The experience summarized by the departments and the training section are used as the basis for working out aids on methods for organizing this type of training process and for developing an orderly system of report documents for the assignment performed by the cadets and students. It has become the rule at the school to assign instructors to a

certain type of on-the-job training for a period of three to four years. This is done in order to provide a high level of supervision. This is especially important with a decentralized system of supervision, in which instructors from several different departments are involved in the classes. Supervisory officers from the main department, who are responsible for a measure, account for at least two-thirds of the total number of instructors assigned.

The preparatory period in particular should be discussed. A great deal, most importantly, the effectiveness of on-the-job training, depends on it. Preparation of the supervisors should be singled out first of all. We begin this work six to eight months in advance by determining which of the officers is to head the group. Each supervisor is familiarized with the conditions under which the work practice and on-the-job training will take place, studies the methods to be used and specifies the literature and documents required. Together with the chief of the training course he divides the cadets and students into work groups. The group leaders study the individual qualities of the trainees and compile a plan for their work during the entire period of their practical training. It concludes with preliminary preparation for a conference on instructional methods, with all of the supervisory officers for the forthcoming type of training invited to attend.

We attempt to make up the groups in such a way that the members of a single training group or section are sent to each unit or enterprise. This is done in the interest of increasing class effectiveness, because this makes it possible to organize mutual control among the cadets and students. It also increases their personal responsibility. A meeting on instructional methods is conducted for the entire group prior to their departure for practical training. The purpose and tasks of the on-the-job training are reviewed at the meeting, as well as its organization, the procedure for conducting the training, the planning of the workdays, record keeping and monitoring of the performance of the assignments. The same is then done in each individual group. These matters are also brought up at party and Komsomol meetings. We devote serious attention to material-technical support for the forthcoming measure and to the individual preparation of each cadet and student.

The course chiefs have an important role in the organization of on-the-job training. Together with the department they plan the distribution of the men and of the party and Komsomol aktiv, assign group and team leaders, monitor clarification of the individual assignments to the cadets and students, see that they are provided with the authorized uniforms, obtain travel documents, and organize the departure and reception of the subunits. This matter is handled in a creative manner by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonels G. Akulich and A. Panarin, Engineer-Major S. Tereshchenko and others. They have a good knowledge of the measures to be conducted and know how to distribute the people efficiently and to focus their efforts on fulfilling the training program well.

How is highly efficient on-the-job training for the future air engineers achieved? Primarily by further improving the overall structure of the measures involved and by scientifically substantiating the number of practical tasks and their duration. When compiling new training plans serious attention should obviously be devoted to perfecting a unified system for organizing on-the-job training for all the faculties of engineering VUZ's and coordinating the dates for conducting such measures. After all, the time spent by a supervisor with cadets or students is sometimes reduced because of a lack of coordination. Most importantly, however, this has a negative effect on preparations for on-the-job training and complicates the conduct of classes after the trainees arrive in the unit.

The effectiveness of their work depends greatly on the demandingness and activeness of the specialists assigned to supervise on-the-job training directly in the unit or at a repair enterprise. The future specialists are taught prudently and assiduously by Engineer-Majors G. Chechev, B. Paleshko, I. Kalavichus, A. Orlov, I. Latsa and M. Frolov, Engineer-Captains V. Krativin and V. Budanov, and other officers.

The activity level of the cadets and students in the work practice or in the process of on-the-job training, for example, can be judged by how many rationalization proposals they submit, how frequently they speak at scientific-technical conferences and seminars, and whether they participate in the public-political measures carried out in the unit. As a rule, 30 to 50 percent of the cadets and students submit rationalization proposals at our school during the course of their on-the-job training, and 20 to 30 percent read reports or present information at conferences and seminars. In addition, each trainee delivers one or two lectures and conducts three or four political information sessions and talks. Senior Lieutenants of Technical Service V. Komar and V. Modestov, cadets, were presented with certificates by the unit commander for their active participation in public-political work during their on-the-job training, and cadets V. Chursin, B. Borisov, V. Tikhonov and N. Bakumenko, Sergeants V. Kalashnikov and Yu. Rebrov, and others have received expressions of appreciation.

During their on-the-job training cadets and students help to equip the unit training classes and improve their technical base. Last year alone Senior Lieutenants of Technical Service V. Shkarin and S. Doroshchenko, cadets P. Dolgov, S. Malyavkin, P. Proshin and certain others worked out and introduced two or three rationalization proposals each and received excellent evaluations from command.

We feel, however, that we are still not doing everything possible to make the practical classes more effective. In our opinion, for example, it would be practical to assign air units to a VUZ for several years for group on-the-job training. This would make it possible to provide better contact between the training institution and the combat collectives, and, would naturally contribute to the accumulation of experience in organizing and conducting on-the-job training and shorten the transitional period.

Experience has shown that individual on-the-job training in the final stage of training in that position which the student will fill following graduation helps to considerably reduce the time required for a young air engineer to fit in to the formation. This will also make the classes more effective, since it increases the concern of both the trainee and the supervisors of on-the-job training. It is also essential to further improve the methods used to conduct it. We should work out new and more efficient forms of training for cadets and students as applicable to each period of on-the-job training. First of all we should study possibilities for employing special-problem training and establish a skill level for the practical training of the cadets.

A study of the working experience of graduates of engineering VUZ's has shown that the task of improving the methods used to train cadets and students in practical techniques for organizing and conducting classes is an urgent one. On-the-job training provides extremely good conditions for inculcating command and methods skills in the future engineers and for developing their teaching abilities. We therefore need to work out scientifically based methods for providing the air specialists with teacher's training.

The task of increasing the effectiveness of on-the-job training and the methodological level of its organization and conduct, as well as improving its supervision, especially in the units and at enterprises, is now a comprehensive task and requires persistent, thoroughly considered and continuous work.

In conclusion I would like to stress the importance of objectivity in evaluating the work of a cadet or student during his individual on-the-job training in the final stage. After all, this provides the basis for the overall evaluation of program fulfillment when the cadets and students depart for the units. The deputy commanders for IAS [engineer aviation service] and the engineers in the various specialties, as well as the heads of Air Force repair enterprises should therefore compile the evaluations from a position of great responsibility and principle.

11499
CSO: 1801

TECHNICAL CRITIQUES IMPROVE AIRCRAFT SERVICING PROCEDURES

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
30 Jun 78 pp 38-39

[Article by Eng-Maj V. Trifonov: "I Propose That It Be Subjected to a Critique..."]

[Text] Technical critiques conducted with specialists of the IAS [Engineer Aviation Service] have a large role in the campaign for excellent servicing of the aviation equipment and improvement of flight safety and the operational reliability of the aircraft equipment on the ground and in the air. The forms and methods employed are therefore constantly being improved in our unit (chast). Supervisory personnel of the service see to it that those responsible strictly adhere to critique timing and procedures as specified in the documents. We systematically summarize progressive experience, note and eliminate any deficiencies revealed.

The critiques are skillfully used for improving the training and indoctrination of specialists of the radioelectronic equipment service, for example, by Engineer-Major N. Sushchik and Senior Engineer-Lieutenant V. Razin. These officers prepare for the critiques in advance, at the beginning of each month. And immediately prior to exercises they thoroughly study the operating logs and notes on personal observations once again. Not until this has been done do they outline the plan.

There is a list of mandatory questions which must be brought up for critique, and the procedure for conducting the critique has been defined. Reality is full of diversity, however, as we know. It is far from always possible to reflect each nuance in the basic documents. This means that the quality and efficiency of a critique depends to a considerable degree on the initiative and quest of the commander who organizes and conducts it. Engineer-Major Sushchik and Senior Engineer-Lieutenant Razin never forget this.

This is how they prepared for one of the critiques, for example. Sushchik made a careful study of all the malfunctions of radioelectronic equipment during the month, ascertained and analyzed the causes. And Razin tallied

the quantitative indicators for the work of the different groups and the percentage of errors committed by the servicemen. The figures indicate that the specialists worked better than they had previously. The engineers were pleased: one of the most important elements of increased reliability for the aviation equipment lies in such an attitude toward the assigned job.

Officers Sushchik and Razin discussed the information obtained in detail. They then refreshed their memory with respect to the instructions, regulations and report documents received by the unit on the jobs performed on servicing days, evaluations of the condition of various equipment, and information on inspections of the equipment by supervisory personnel of the regiment's IAS. They also considered information on the condition and maintenance of monitoring equipment and ground equipment, as well as on the observance of rules governing its use.

Thanks to this preparatory work both officers arrived at the critique with a precise and well-developed plan and with a clear concept of which problems should be discussed in what sequence. The specialists naturally benefited a great deal from such a critique.

The servicemen learned of the results of their work for the period just ended and about how this influenced the performance of tasks facing the unit. A fitting place was given over to an analysis of the causes of deficiencies occurring in the process of operating the equipment. Each of them was analyzed in detail.

It is no secret that the officer in charge sometimes limits a critique to an enumeration of defects and errors. Naturally, this is also necessary. It is not enough, however, to point out errors: it is important to evaluate them from a position of principle, to demonstrate graphically why they occurred, how to perform properly and how to make efficient use of time, personnel and equipment.

Officers Sushchik and Razin assume with absolute justification that although it is called a technical critique it must also have an indoctrinational effect and must not turn into just a review of purely professional matters. This is why in preparing for such a measure both officers attempt to establish the source of the errors: was it a lack of training or a specialist's negligence to his duties? The focus of the discussion is selected in accordance with this, and preventive measures are outlined.

The name of Junior Sergeant A. Plotnikov, a mechanic, was mentioned at the critique under discussion, for example. An aircraft's take-off on a regular mission had been held up because of him. In their discussion of the incident officers Sushchik and Razin stressed the fact that it had not occurred because of Plotnikov's lack of knowledge or skill but as a result of carelessness on his part. They immediately explained the nature of his negligence and how the other servicemen should work in order to prevent any future such occurrences. And it was recommended that the mechanic's superior be more demanding of him.

It was a different situation when the engineers rated the work of Officers V. Arutyunov and V. Vashchenko, who had also committed errors in their work. The fact is that Arutyunov and Vashchenko had not examined with adequate thoroughness the specific operating features of one of the radar systems of a combat aircraft. Engineer-Major Sushchik and Senior Engineer-Lieutenant Razin decided to arrange a demonstration training session on the aviation equipment for the men.

We are firmly convinced that this sort of individual approach to the training and indoctrination of air specialists, typical for these officers, helps them greatly to achieve success. After all, the groups of the radioelectronic equipment service include people with different educations and different levels of experience.

There are other valuable and interesting aspects of the engineers' work. For example, they not only thoroughly analyze errors but also make an example of the specialists who have achieved definite success. The engineers praised the work of individual specialists in the servicing groups, specifically that of Warrant Officer (Praporshchik) B. Panov. Perhaps his successes are sometimes not so significant, but it is still important to point them out, to explain what made them possible. A critique becomes a real school of progressive experience in such a case.

The servicemen demonstrated a marked interest in the detailed comparison of results with those of the previous month, which convincingly attests to their great interest in the results of their work. Experience has shown that such comparisons motivate the specialists and force them to take a self-critical look at their personal contribution to the work of strengthening the unit's combat readiness.

In our opinion, the brief talks by those discussed by the engineer in the technical critiques have proven valuable. This increases the activeness of the specialists. In addition, collective discussion of matters disturbing the servicemen contribute to the search for better methods of operating the radioelectronic equipment, reduces the time required to ready it for flights and stimulates creative thinking. An exchange of opinions between air specialists V. Taranenko and A. Medvetskiy, for example, resulted in an idea for rationalization proposals, the realization of which made it possible to perform the work on the airborne equipment and aircraft ferrying devices better and more rapidly.

Let us give yet another example. Once, during a technical critique, Officer A. Abramov explained to Engineer-Major Sushchik a proposal that an additional check be performed on certain aircraft sets following the performance of periodic servicing. The specialist had no special reason to doubt that they were in good working order. Despite this, Captain of Technical Service Abramov expressed the following desire:

"We need to make an additional check of a number of their parameters."

"Possibly, although such a check on the flight line is not covered by the standard regulations," Sushchik remarked.

"I propose that this question be brought up at a critique," Abramov answered.

"We shall try," the engineer agreed.

The initiative was also approved by the unit methods council. What was to be done, and how, were discussed during a technical critique. And the work performed did in fact help to improve the reliability of airborne radio equipment.

The following initiative of Engineer-Major Sushchik also deserves approval. Several deviations in the work of radio communication units were once detected within a relatively short period of time. Sushchik called upon Officer A. Yakovlev, senior technician of a servicing group, to reveal and analyze the causes. He could naturally have done everything himself, but he reasoned correctly that today's technician is tomorrow's engineer (in addition, Yakovlev had successfully passed the entrance exams to a higher military aviation engineering school). This meant that it would be expedient to prepare him to perform his new duties in advance. Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service Yakovlev coped with his assignment with excellence, and the critique was a thorough one.

A technical critique ordinarily ends with specification of the positions occupied by the groups in the service and formulation of future tasks. A discussion of the various specialties is then conducted. The analysis in this case is more extensive and detailed, and the tasks are precisely defined.

As a rule, technical critiques in the services are conducted on one of the last days of the month and last $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours. Unit servicemen have appraised this important and necessary form of training and indoctrination. Officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers regularly bring up this or that matter of interest to them during a critique. Naturally, such proposals are always taken into account. Furthermore, the unit engineers in the different specialties themselves willingly exchange opinions as to how to improve methods and make the critiques more effective.

We have accumulated a definite amount of positive experience in conducting critiques. There are still many reserves for improving them, however. Unfortunately, use is not always made in the critiques of drawings, blueprints and diagrams which can be photographed and the film stored for long periods. We also feel that the complete records of the critiques should be saved in order always to have information on the most typical errors of the specialists, which have been detected for the first time, and on malfunctions which can result from such errors.

Careful preparation and the skillful conduct of technical critiques increases the interest of IAS specialists in them, stimulates creative thinking and enriches them with progressive know-how.

IN-FLIGHT REFUELING EXPERIENCES RECOUNTED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
30 Jun 78 p 41

[Article by Col (Res) G. Vishnevskiy: "A Refueling at Dawn"]

[Text] In 1957 one of the newspapers published a small article, which told how the crew of a heavy jet plane had successfully carried out a long flight with an in-flight refueling. It was as though those brief lines in the newspaper summed up the results of the next stage of the effort to increase flying ranges.

Colonel A. Sarygin, subsequently an honored test pilot of the USSR and Hero of the Soviet Union, was one of the first to check the equipment for an in-flight refueling. A group of instructor crews of line units began to master the new system soon thereafter. It included the author of this article. We were trained by Colonel N. Novozhilov. Major V. Nicheukin piloted the aircraft to be fueled, and Captain A. Korovyanskiy flew the tanker. The group's technical personnel were headed by Engineer-Captain G. Timofeyev.

The job facing us was a difficult but very interesting one. We studied the special equipment, the peculiarities of the piloting techniques and other problems, and set about the flights. We immediately encountered numerous difficulties.

Naturally, there was a system of methods for performing such assignments. It had been developed by test pilots A. Sarygin, Yu. Sukhov, I. Azbiyevich, S. Dedukh and V. Kipelkin, test navigators N. Zatsepa and R. Semovskikh, and others. We received a great deal of valuable advice from them. Things did not work out in the air immediately by far, however.

The maneuvering zone was limited, and the bomber to be refueled had to approach to an adverse range. And certain crews began to come into the tanker's slipstream. It proved to be an extremely treacherous force, which at that time was still little understood.

If the crew of an aircraft to be refueled occupied the initial position over the hose with an adverse range at the distance indicated and then lowered itself smoothly onto the hose, it would always enter the tanker's slipstream. At first, it seemed to simply push out the wing, but when the adverse range was increased only slightly it would draw the aircraft into the dangerous stream. It would become difficult to control the heavy machine.

As a rule, the attempt would end with the aircraft to be refueled thrown from right to left in the upper half of the slipstream (we began to call this "being thrown through the keel"). The lack of knowledge of the nature of such phenomena and of methods of combating them greatly depressed the aircraft commanders at first, and made them lose confidence in their ability. Each one felt that this occurred because of poor skills in piloting techniques.

Soon everything began to become clear, however: shared work and its difficulties bring people together. The aircraft commanders began to exchange opinions, to tell of their impressions during each flight. This produced good results.

We performed missions in pairs. Once Major A. Samoylov and I found that dangerous maneuvering zone during the lining-up and coupling process. We no longer entered the slipstream. And all because the lining-up and coupling process were performed beneath it. This was made possible by permitting the completely extended hose to sag. Everything was subsequently gone over jointly on the ground and tested in the air, and became the basis for the methods used to perform the maneuvering during the lining-up and coupling process. Everyone then began to perform more boldly.

The question of what should be the main reference point during a refueling, the tanker or its refueling hose had not been resolved, however. Opinions differed. The main difficulty of an in-flight refueling lay in the fact that as the commander of the aircraft to be refueled lined up the wing with the hose he could not see the wing's position relative to the hose but performed the maneuver according to signals from the weapon positions. As the aircraft approached the hose the pilot instinctively concentrated all of his attention on it, seeming to forget about the aircraft. Some comrades became so accustomed to orienting themselves relative to the hose alone that they even spoke out against the need to determine their position by the tanker. And this was precisely the cause of their failures in in-flight refueling. As a rule, after the pilots were shown the method of orientation with the aircraft, they could immediately see its convenience and simplicity.

As Major Samoylov and I were performing our first independent paired flight we encountered the following situation. After taking on the fuel and performing the disengagement maneuver, the refueling hose did not separate from the contact assembly on our aircraft. When it stretched tight the hose brought the aircraft closer together. At any moment the plane could enter the tanker's slipstream.

"Release the cable," I gave the command in order to increase maneuvering possibilities, and gained altitude.

The cable did not disengage, however, and the aircraft were approaching each other. It was now extremely difficult for me to prevent rolling. It ended when Samoylov and I broke the hose at a weak point, after which the aircraft exchanged positions: ours was to the left, the tanker was to the right. A collision had been prevented.

The reason why the cable had not been released at my command was revealed later, when the commander of the refueling aircraft's firing units admitted to regular Master Sergeant N. Borzdov that he had simply lost his head in the situation.

In subsequent flights we were able to improve the methods of mastering aerial refueling and to refine safety measures for the maneuvering zone. The practice of photographing each mission with a camera gun was introduced on the basis of the experience acquired. We had films which all of the group members could review.

Our group completed the program within a relatively short time and began training instructors from air units (chasti). The mass performance of flights with one or two in-flight refuelings then began. This type of combat training required exceptional aircraft piloting precision in the maneuvering zone, daily and persistent improvement of skills, and a high level of teamwork by the entire crew, especially the commanders of the aircraft and the firing units. It was important that the commands issued by the commander of the firing units be precise and that the rate at which they were given corresponded to the pace at which the pilot performed the maneuver.

During one of the flights involving two in-flight refuelings, for example, I encountered an incident which might at first glance appear insignificant. We had set out on the assignment with the onset of darkness and had taken a course toward the east. The first encounter with a tanker was to take place at dawn.

And that is what happened. We began preparations for the refueling. The rising sun created a halo around the tanker, however, which blinded us. It was impossible to change the flight conditions in order to eliminate this interference. We had to find some sort of additional reference points on the tanker, which would weaken the interference.

We decided to use the aircraft armament as reference points. At my command the guns in the upper and lower mounts were turned to the right, the top ones being raised 45 to 60° and the bottom ones lowered by the same angle. Extended-duty Master Sergeant Borzdov grasped the sense of this instruction in the existing situation. He subsequently gave the command to approach at the same rate at which I could perform the maneuver using the auxiliary reference points. We successfully accomplished the task.

Two decades have gone by since in-flight refuelings were mastered. The systems and equipment designated for this purpose have been continuously perfected. Experience has accumulated. This difficult type of flight training still requires excellent teamwork on the part of the crews, however, unweakened attention and the exceptionally strict performance of safety measures.

11499
CSO: 1801

ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR ERROR DESCRIBED

Mcscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
30 Jun 78 pp 42-43

[Article by Col Ye. Bryakov, military pilot first-class: "And Vibrations Began"]

[Text] Lieutenant A. Koshel', together with his instructor, Major B. Ivanov, was to perform a check flight with the cockpit hood covered, with a direct landing path and then two 180° turns. The weather was favorable for the execution of the assigned mission. Weather conditions deteriorated perceptibly in one of the areas before the trainer's take-off, however. The flight operation officer therefore ordered Officer Ivanov to perform additional reconnaissance.

Ivanov flew for some time in the proper direction. He reported everything he saw to ground. The instructor turned toward the airfield and gave control of the aircraft to Lieutenant Koshel', militery pilot third-class.

The aircraft was approaching the second turn. Major Ivanov did not close off the cockpit hood, however. He subsequently explained that he had done this to permit the trainee to see better and to observe a nearby aircraft.

"I was also concentrating on looking around us," the pilot said as he described the subsequent development of events, "and forgot about maintaining our flight conditions. Suddenly I was jerked out of my seat." (He named the speed at which this had occurred.) I felt a large negative load factor. The control stick moved almost up to the instrument panel. I grabbed it and threw it toward myself. I simultaneously pressed a button, disengaging the automatic control system, and reduced engine rpm's to idle. The negative load factor was reduced somewhat. It then increased again sharply...".

The crew found itself in a very difficult situation: the aircraft began vibrating. What was the matter? Perhaps there was some unexpected failure of the equipment, as certain comrades attempted to explain the situation at first? No. The aircraft equipment, specifically the control system, was operating flawlessly. The motion of the aircraft with extensive alternating load factors resulted from errors by the airmen.

This was definitely confirmed by data from the objective control facilities. An analysis of the SARPP tape, which was processed after the flight was completed, showed that for four minutes and ten seconds following take-off everything was normal. There were none of the typical deviations in the parameters recorded. A smooth increase in speed was then recorded. For some time, however, the flight periodic vibrations of the stabilizer were totally absorbed by the steering unit of the automatic control system. They did not influence the aircraft's behavior: the load factor was constant on the tape. A significant increase in deviations of the stabilizer and the load factor from normal were then noted, and their frequency and extent increased sharply after the automatic control system was disengaged.

The specialists investigating the incident concluded that the vibrations had occurred because the crew had exceeded the maximum operating speed established for flight under the given conditions. If Major Ivanov and Lieutenant Koshel' had not attempted to eliminate the aircraft's vibrations with uncoordinated operation of the control sticks but had smoothly set the controls for gaining altitude, reduced engine speed and lowered the air brakes, the situation would immediately have been defused, so to speak. The airmen did nothing of the sort, however. Furthermore, after deciding that the automatic control system had failed the instructor disengaged it hastily and completely without justification. The unskillful action taken in an attempt to counter the vibrations by moving the control stick lead to a situation in which it was extremely difficult to pilot the aircraft.

Let us discuss the following aspects of the matter. The unit commander, his deputy and the squadron commander unanimously maintained that preparations for the assignment planned for Lieutenant Koshel' were performed thoroughly and well. The pilot's state of preparedness for the flight was, in their words, also checked in complete accordance with the requirements laid out in the guiding documents. And Major Ivanov's training allegedly left no room for doubt.

The airmen's gross blunder was preceded by a number of deficiencies in the planning of the beginning air fighter's training and the methods used. Lieutenant Koshel' had had little experience. The officer had arrived relatively recently from school and had only just completed the retraining program and begun working on group teamwork in an unfamiliar aircraft when he committed the serious error. Furthermore, not long before this flight the lieutenant had been hospitalized for a fairly long period.

Naturally, all of this should have been taken into account without fail when organizing the young officer's continued flight training. The commanders should have checked the piloting techniques of Lieutenant Koshel' and ascertained as accurately as possible the extent to which he had lost his former skill and determined the procedure for restoring them in the future and which of the exercises he had already mastered should be repeated. Unfortunately, none of this was done: they simply began "moving" the pilot through the program.

I feel that the following detail also deserves attention. When a detailed analysis was begun as to why the aircraft vibrations had occurred it was found that Officer Koshel' had flown the minimum number of flights involving some of the exercises covered in the program. It goes without saying that this also had a negative effect.

We know how important proper use of the objective control facilities is for an air fighter's professional growth. Thorough and systematic analysis of the materials obtained by means of this equipment makes it possible to reveal errors immediately and to indicate effective preventive measures to rectify and eliminate them. In this case, there was no such analysis, as the result of which certain deviations, specifically, the young airman's failure to maintain the speeds established for certain flight phases, remained unnoticed and were repeated.

The preconditions for the occurrence of the vibrations were thus generated by degrees, as it were. And not just because of the above-named factors, although we stress, the faults enumerated above are what created the conditions for this situation. Additional omissions in the organizational and methods work of the subunit and unit leaders were revealed in the analysis of the occurrence. This is graphically illustrated by the following example.

There were no flights in the unit on the eve of the flight day on which the aircraft vibrations occurred. When certain adjustments were entered in the plan log the deputy regimental commander substituted for Lieutenant Koshel' a check flight with the cockpit enclosed for a flight on a combat aircraft: it was revealed that the young officer had not performed one flight exercise.

And the senior comrades, as we mentioned above, maintained that the preliminary flight preparation (of the initial and the refresher training, which is without question what mainly interests us) had been fully performed. The verification as well. The commander of the flight in which Koshel' serves, was on detached duty, and the squadron commander was training the pilot. It was the latter who verified his knowledge. Such an arrangement contains a fairly significant error in methods.

It would appear that Major Ivanov, military pilot first-class, bears the bulk of the blame for the incident: the individual who is to fly with the air fighter is primarily responsible for teaching and checking his abilities prior to the flight. The instructor somehow forgot this simple truth. He had not bothered to see that the planned exercise was analyzed thoroughly and in detail, that the peculiarities of its performance be gone over without fail, and, finally, he had failed simply to establish the proper psychological contact with his trainee. Delegating everything to the squadron commander, Ivanov had limited his effort to attending the classes.

His role on the flight was approximately the same. Upon completing the additional weather reconnaissance Officer Ivanov had turned control of the aircraft over to Lieutenant Koshel', considering his mission completed. His

reasoning was apparently the following: "Since the cockpit hood is not enclosed nothing important can happen."

In other words, the instructor behaved in the air not like a teacher but like a passenger. Even after entering the circle his attention had not been on flying the aircraft. It is not surprising that Major Ivanov noticed belatedly the large acceleration permitted by Lieutenant Koshel'. He noticed it only after the aircraft had begun vibrating laterally.

This incident was analyzed in detail with the unit flight personnel, and those responsible were punished. We have discussed it in such great detail in order to stress once more the fact that any violation of the laws and regulations in existence in the aviation can lead to very serious consequences.

11499
CSO: 1801

TRAINING RESULTS IN THE TRANSBAYKAL MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 Jul 78 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Gen A. Lizichev, Military Council Member, Chief, Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District]

[Text] Soldiers of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District have added many brilliant pages to the heroic history of our glorious armed forces. As long ago as in the Civil War soldiers of the Daurian Front, as it was called then, destroyed the counterrevolution in improbably difficult conditions under the command of S. Lazo. Later, when Japan initiated an armed conflict against the USSR and Mongolian Peoples Republic in May 1939 at the Khalkhin-Gol River, Transbaykal soldiers proved themselves to be the best examples of true valor, heroism, and full devotion to the motherland and Lenin's work. Performing their international duty, Soviet soldiers destroyed the invaders and cleared them from Mongolian territory. Seventy Red Army soldiers and commanders were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title. The high combat and moral-political qualities of the Transbaykal soldiers revealed themselves especially clearly in the Great Patriotic War. Fifteen units and formations earned the Guards title, more than 600 soldiers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title, and about a hundred became full cavaliers of the Order of Glory.

Many famous troop commanders of the Soviet Army matured and became battle-seasoned in the harsh Transbaykal school. They include four-time Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, marshals of the Soviet Union K. I. Rokossovskiy, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, I. S. Moskalenko, P. K. Koshevoy, and M. V. Zakharov, and others.

Transbaykal soldiers take special pride in the fact that CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev had once served in the same district. He served here, in a tank unit, and he served honorably. Here is what was

written about him in our district newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU on 6 October 1936: "...Comrade L. I. Brezhnev is a communist, the son of a laborer, and he himself is a laborer from Dnepropetrovsk. He is an outstanding student. From the very first days he became one of the organizers of the struggle for outstanding indices in combat and political training. He led other comrades through personal example. While serving as acting platoon commander he saw that the platoon performed its fire training mission with a grade of excellent. In his one year with the army he has received five letters of commendation and one monetary prize.

"Presently Comrade Brezhnev is working as a political commissar in the same subunit. The barracks and the Lenin nook have been outfitted exceptionally well under his guidance...."

Leonid Il'ich, meanwhile, recalls his military service in our district with great warmth. He spoke proudly about this during his trip to Siberia and the Far East in April of this year. He visited military subunits in Peschanka, near Chita, where he was stationed as a young soldier. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev inspected the training material base and the museum of battle glory, and he attended political lessons in one of the unit's subunits.

L. I. Brezhnev made the following note in the Distinguished Visitors Log:

"Dear Soldiers and Officers!

"These places are memorable and precious to me. I began military service here in 1935-1936 in a tank unit.

"Thank you for preserving the traditions of soldiers who have defended our motherland in the Great Patriotic War. Be also worthy of those who gave their lives to fight for and protect the borders of the Soviet motherland.

"I wish you good service."

While in Chita L. I. Brezhnev met with the district command and discussed some issues concerning the state of troop combat and political training with them. CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov took part in the discussion. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed confidence that as with all defenders of the Soviet Union, Transbaykal soldiers will continue to be constantly combat ready, guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor, and that they will honorably perform their sacred duty to the people and our great motherland.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's visit to Chita and the district's military subunits, and his orders to the Transbaykal soldiers were received by our soldiers

with tremendous inspiration. Meetings were held in all units and subunits. Enlisted men, sergeants, warrant officers, officers, and generals expressed their avid filial devotion to the Soviet motherland and the people, and their deep gratefulness to their Communist Party and personally to Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev for the tremendous concern over strengthening the country's defense capabilities and its armed forces.

"I am proud," said Private 1st Class A. Kostylev, an outstanding soldier of combat and political training, during a meeting, "that I am serving in the district in which Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev had served his early years. To me, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statement that young soldiers must be honorable heirs of those who gave their lives in the defense of the Soviet motherland's borders is an order of the Party, of all the Soviet people addressed to us, the soldiers of the 1970's, and in behalf of my fellow servicemen I promise that through persistent shock military labor we will prolong the glorious battle traditions of our beloved fatherland's older generations.

Leonid Il'ich's meetings with the soldiers, his speeches given during his trip to Siberia and the Far East, and his memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" (The Little Land) and "Vozrozhdeniye" (Resurrection) provided a new powerful impetus to all of the ideological-educational and organizational work of commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations.

A scientific-practical conference of executives and ideological workers of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District and Chitinskaya Oblast was interesting and the subject matter was substantial. It was held in the museum of battle glory, which Comrade L. I. Brezhnev visited and where a copy of his book "Vozrozhdeniye" he had given to the soldiers and his autographed photo portrait are kept.

The conference was opened by CPSU Central Inspection Commission Member, Troop Commander of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General P. A. Belik. Next the audience listened to the report "Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's Memoirs 'Vozrozhdeniye' --a Treasurehouse of Combat Experience, of Experience in Party-Political Work, an Eloquent Statement of the Soviet People's Great Act of Heroism."

Generals, officers, and representatives of the Chita public took part in the discussion. Summarizing the results of the conference, Army General P. A. Belik shared the personal impressions he gained from meeting with Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. In behalf of the conference participants and all of the district personnel he expressed deep gratefulness to Leonid Il'ich for his remarkable memoirs "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye." In conclusion he said that every soldier, responding to the directives and recommendations of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, will continue to fight

persistently to strengthen the motherland's eastern borders and successfully implement the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Then a motion picture of the life and activities of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "The Story of a Communist," was shown.

The tasks spelled out by the directives and recommendations of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev given during his presence in the district were discussed with great enthusiasm at meetings of the active party members of the district and the formations, and in the units and subunits. Communists initiated and championed a movement of the Transbaykal soldiers to implement Leonid Il'ich's orders.

Information on Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's trip to Siberia and the Far East and his memoirs "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye" are in the center of attention of lecture groups, agitprop collectives, lecturer groups, officers clubs, enlisted clubs, and libraries. Publicity on this material has the goal of heroic-patriotic indoctrination of soldiers, and it inspires them to do glorious military work in the socialist competition, which is presently going on under the slogan "Dependably protect the socialist fatherland, be in constant combat readiness, master weapons and equipment persistently, improve combat skills." I note with satisfaction that the effectiveness of training and indoctrination increased in the summer training period, that more-sensible use is being made of training time, and that the quality of combat and political training is high.

New initiatives are born in the course of socialist competition. Thus seamen of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet appealed in a letter to personnel of the tank unit in which Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev began his service with a proposal to regularly exchange the experience of working for high combat readiness and firm discipline, and to inform one another of the results of combat and political training and of the progress in the socialist competition.

In their return letter to the Pacific Fleet seamen the soldiers of the Nth Tank Unit of the Transbaykal Military District wrote in particular:

"We can report with pride today that as a result of the winter training period 40 percent of the unit's soldiers have become outstanding soldiers of combat and political training, 87 have become ranked sportsmen, and 100 have become classed specialists. The company visited by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has earned outstanding grades, and for high indices in combat and political training it was awarded the commemorative banner of the Chitinskaya Oblast Komsomol.

"We believe that constant mutual exchange of work experience will help us to better solve the problems posed to us by the party, the people, and personally Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev.

"The best fighting man's regards!"

Troops of the Nth Tank Unit,
Order of Lenin Transbaykal
Military District

The patriotic upsurge of the defenders of our great motherland's eastern borders is reflected in concrete military deeds. Soldiers of the "Fastov" Tank Regiment, Port Arthur soldiers, and soldiers of the Guards Motorized Rifle Vienna-Mukden Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment have attained new successes. Missilemen of the subunit in which Captain L. Yerofeyev serves have successfully passed yet another examination. In routine integrated exercises they significantly surpassed the standards for preparing missiles for launch, receiving an excellent grade. Aerial skills have risen even higher among fighter pilots of the air squadron in which Captain V. Bezrukov, who was recently awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree, is the deputy commander for political affairs.

Warrant officers--the closest assistants to officers in the training and indoctrination of enlisted men and sergeants--play a major role in all military achievements. They confidently command platoons, lead Komsomol organizations, and head various sections of the technical service and troop services. Some of them have earned high government awards. Take as an example Warrant Officer Nikolai Poshvenchuk, a platoon commander in a missile subunit and the son of a fighting World War II veteran. On deciding to make the military his career he communicated his decision to his father. In response Feliks Stepanovich wrote to his son: "You are not choosing the easy way, my son. But now that you have chosen the military profession, I will say only one thing: Never retreat in the face of difficulties, because your rank, 'warrant officer,' means something special, and a standard bearer has never turned back. I have told you this many times." Warrant Officer Poshvenchuk is faithful to his father's parting words. He indoctrinates and teaches his subordinates competently. His squad took first place in the unit in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. Warrant Officer N. Poshvenchuk has been awarded the medal "For Excellence in Military Service," 2d Degree for his deeds and his honor. Or take another warrant officer, Aleksandr Vozhakov, who is the secretary of the subunit's Komsomol bureau. He had become well acquainted with Komsomol workers while serving as an enlisted man.

He decided to make the army his life, and he transferred to Komsomol work. During his years of service he became a highly qualified specialist and mastered all of the subunit's organic weapons. The Komsomol organization

he heads is the unit's best. We can boldly say that Warrant Officer Vozhakov, a delegate to the 28th Komsomol Congress contributed together with the commander and other communists in the subunit in achieving this goal.

Many such examples can be cited. Warrant Officer Yevgeniy Timofeyevich Kuznetsov has been serving in the Soviet Army for more than 20 years. He is the subunit's master sergeant. Warrant Officer Kuznetsov deserves great credit for the fact that it is distinguished by firm discipline, organization, and exemplary field skills. Warrant Officer Vyacheslav Arsent'yevich Astyukov is the secretary of a battalion party organization. He influences nonmembers with his words and deeds, encouraging them to follow him. The communist warrant officer devotes all of his effort and experience to teaching and indoctrinating young soldiers; he teaches them to perform their duty to the motherland as he does.

The district's warrant officers are fighting hand in hand with the officers to upgrade the quality and effectiveness of the training process. They are trying to make every enlisted man and sergeant well aware of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's orders to Transbaykal soldiers. Active communists and Komsomol members are intensifying their work of teaching the motherland's young defenders the glorious revolutionary, battle, and labor traditions of the army and people.

Commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations are striving to infuse the soldiers with the spirit of a class approach to the events and phenomena of life, a spirit of friendship and brotherhood with all countries of the socialist fraternity, and mainly our nearest neighbor and friend, the Mongolian Peoples Republic, and its glorious soldiers. At the same time they are devoting constant attention to unmasking bourgeois and Maoist ideology and the anti-Soviet nature of Peking's policy.

Closely united about the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee headed by an outstanding political and state official of our era, Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, Transbaykal soldiers are fully resolved to honorably justify their mission of protecting and reliably defending the eastern borders of our great Soviet motherland.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1978

11004

CSO: 1801

TRAINING OF NEW TANK PERSONNEL DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 Jul 78 p 7

[Article by Jr Sgt M. Pechinin: "The Crew Gets a New Man"]

[Text] We were performing one of the first driving exercises at the tank practice range. Private Vladislav Tunitsa, a young driver-mechanic, was at the controls of our tank. This was his "maiden voyage." The command was transmitted, and we began on our route.

When we returned to the start line my friends sympathetically asked me:

"What was wrong with your tank?"

There on the side lines, it appeared to them that the tank had been out of control. It traveled in jumps and starts, and at times it simply stopped. Its engines would alternately scream uncontrollably and suddenly die.

Of course, the problem was not with the vehicle. When another crew took over the tank, everything changed. The tank followed the route at a good speed, and it easily surmounted various obstacles: In a word, it behaved obediently in all situations.

During the critique the subunit commander graded our crew's actions as unsatisfactory. And in the socialist competition, in which we had rarely dropped from first place, we immediately dropped toward the bottom. The gunlayer and the loader were restless, and they aimed unflattering barbs at the new driver. I cut their unnecessary chatter off right away, recalling that things did not go entirely well at first for them either.

I can well remember the face of the young driver-mechanic--guilt-ridden and embarrassed. Apparently he had not expected such a failure either. He took it hard. I knew from experience that I should not reprimand and, all the more so, chew out this subordinate for the errors he made on the route. Had I done so, I would have undermined his faith in his capabilities and in himself completely. Moreover this was only his second week

in the crew. This is too short a time to analyze a person, to understand his character and his attitude toward his work. Thus I refrained from hasty conclusions and from dressing him down. I decided to give him moral support, take him under my wing, and help him to gain proficiency in his specialty and become a full-fledged member of our collective.

I began with general considerations, with something known to be needed--an atmosphere of benevolence in the crew. After all, without a united collective permeated with a spirit of comradship it would be difficult to expect any sort of positive results. Never expect success when each person reproaches the next, trying to dump the blame for mistakes on a fellow serviceman. Nothing can be expected from dissent alone. But this was the situation in our crew following that ill-fated trip. Mutual relationships were somewhat aggravated. Speaking heart-to-heart with the older servicemen I managed to persuade them that the new man would work himself into his job more quickly if he were to feel true concern and a sincere desire on the part of the older soldiers to turn him into a real specialist, a soldier in all respects. And after the microclimate in the crew improved the young soldier's confidence increased noticeably, and he enjoyed some successes.

It is difficult to describe the young driver-mechanic's development in detail. I believe that it was most important to strengthen his desire to improve his skills. We talked about traditions and held frank discussions about the meaning of service, and about exactingness when a soldier seeks the easy way out. I can say one thing: It was easy and interesting to work with Vladislav. He studied independently a great deal without urging, he listened to my advice attentively, and he turned to experienced driver-mechanics without embarrassment. He became especially close with privates Yuriy Solodukhin and Vitaliy Trutnev, perhaps the company's strongest specialists. They shared their secrets of controlling the vehicle on complicated routes with Vladislav, and they told him how he, the driver-mechanic, could help his comrades strike the target with the first shot.

Vladislav's successes multiplied, and his stature rose. He began to be referred to as a competent driver-mechanic from whom something could be learned. Today he drives his tank with nothing but excellent grades.

Young commanders in our subunit often discuss the methods for indoctrinating subordinates. Such an exchange of opinions is highly beneficial because the individual can learn from the experience of others. As an example I have borrowed many ideas from Sergeant Sergey Gudov. In his opinion a young specialist should first of all be persuaded that he would be capable of any job as long as he diligently satisfies all demands of military service. After all, how often do we encounter the following case? A new man comes to the crew and, naturally, he wants to find his place in the collective and demonstrate that he is a knowledgeable

specialist that can be relied upon. But people are judged by deeds, not words. And if in practical lessons the new man fails due to absence of firm habits, he experiences a blow in morale. As a rule he becomes introverted, losing confidence in his capabilities. This is precisely when the young soldier should be helped to believe in his own strength. How is it to be done? There are many ways. One of them is tactfulness on the part of the commander. As an example Private Yersalyk Sodiyev, formerly a poor student, completed an exercise for a satisfactory grade for the first time. Of course this success was not so great, but Sergeant Sergey Gudov did not ignore it.

"I liked the way you worked today," the sergeant praised Sodiyev. "And had you worked just a little bit better, you would have earned a four."

Then Gudov thoroughly analyzed the cause behind the gunlayer's error and advised him how he could acquire the skill of sighting on a moving target without error. All of this was said tactfully, in a benevolent tone. The praise encouraged the soldier. He listened to the commander's advice attentively and he carefully practiced the procedures in the very first tank fire training session. Private Sodiyev began to devote more time to studying theoretical problems: He read the special literature, regulations, and methodological works. His diligence was rewarded. At the next fire practice he received a good grade.

Being tactful in relation to subordinates and showing comradely concern for their development is not just the sergeant's personal desire; it is a necessity, a requirement of the times. The Military Oath obligates us, the commanders, to know our soldiers well, to respect them, and to bring them up as reliable defenders of the motherland. This means that we do not have the right to remain indifferent to a subordinate's progress in his career. If a specialist is poorly trained and insufficiently educated, a great part of the blame belongs with us, the sergeants.

A commander's tactfulness also manifests itself in the way he develops relationships among subordinates and how he achieves mutual understanding between older servicemen and the young. Of course it would be impossible to give a finished recipe for all cases of life. Some soldiers are gregarious and acquaint themselves quickly with fellow servicemen. Others cannot find a common language with the collective for a long time. The approaches should be strictly individualized here. In my work I try to see that the crew, all three members--the gunlayer, the driver-mechanic, and the loader--always have the same job. They grow closer to one another and learn about their comrades better when working together in lessons, training exercises, duty details, and housekeeping jobs. And when it is time for them to perform in a combat training mission they act in coordinated fashion, holding their common interests above everything else.

A young soldier, our new comrade-in-arms, comes to the crew. The way his service and the way his relationships with fellow servicemen evolve depend directly on the commander--the sergeant--in many ways. We, the junior commanders, should always remember this.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1978

11004
CSO: 1801

SMALL UNIT AIRBORNE TACTICAL TRAINING EXAMINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 Jul 78 pp 8-9

[Article by Maj Gen V. Kostylev, Deputy Commander of Airborne Troops for Combat Training]

[Text] Command personnel training occupies a special place among the tasks posed by the 25th CPSU Congress to the Soviet Armed Forces. Sergeants make up the most numerous category of commanders in our armed forces. The combat readiness of the units and subunits, the quality of the training process, and the state of military discipline and troop service depend on them in many ways. The high requirements of modern warfare make their impression on the training of the airborne sergeant as well.

Most junior commanders in the airborne troops are characterized by high ideological-political maturity and good military knowledge and organizational capabilities, and they possess sound skills in controlling a detachment, a squad, and a crew in battle.

The study of manuals, regulations, and the organization, armament, and tactics of a probable enemy's army has an important place in the training of junior commanders. Without this knowledge they cannot correctly analyze an evolved situation, reveal the enemy's intent, and make the best decision.

Junior commanders in Captain V. Khudyakov's subunit work fruitfully, creatively, with all their effort. An efficient sergeant training system has been developed here, making every lesson in tactical training interesting, instructive, well organized, and well taught. As a result the training goals are achieved in their entirety, and with high quality.

On the eve of lessons, during self-study hours, broad use is made of training films, film strips, diagrams, and of training on terrain models. The officers teach their closest assistants to analyze the situation quickly and to make correct decisions boldly, nurturing their initiative and their will for victory.

Lieutenant R. Zaripov's platoon was given the mission of advancing to the vicinity of Hill 75.1--a road intersection--and blocking the passage of the "enemy's" reserves (see Diagram 1).




Diagram 1

On arriving at the location the platoon commander assessed the terrain. He found out from the senior chief that three "enemy" tanks were advancing along the forest road. Zaripov decided to organize an ambush with the goal of destroying the tanks. Quickly issuing his orders to his subordinates, he checked the platoon's readiness for meeting the "enemy."

At this time Senior Sergeant Kalyauzek, detachment commander, reported that a truck was traveling on the road in the direction of the village of Orlovo. The lieutenant decided to capture it. The idea was bold, and it required decisive, bold action. The airborne troops felled a tree across the road, making it look as if it had been toppled by the wind. On a signal from Senior Sergeant Kalyauzek three soldiers quickly occupied the truck's cab. The driver's attempt at increasing the vehicle's speed and detouring the tree trunk ended in failure. The fight lasted just a few seconds.

Soon the airborne paratroopers set up the vehicle in such a way that it blocked the movement of the approaching column of tanks. The "driver" pretended there was something wrong with the truck. Two soldiers hid

themselves in the cab. The approaching column of three tanks halted. The hatches of the main tank opened, and one of the tank crewmembers turned to the "driver." At this moment Lieutenant Zaripov signaled the platoon. The soldiers entered the engagement decisively. Owing to boldness and initiative the airborne troops completed their mission, capturing two operable tanks and a motor vehicle.

The detachment commanders developed their skills of executing suddenly arising missions in complex conditions.

Also instructive was a lesson held in Senior Lieutenant M. Zolotukhin's platoon (see Diagram 2).




Diagram 2

Key:

1. Nikonovo	3. Belyy
2. Lesnichestvo	4. Abramovo

After landing and rendezvous, the platoon advanced swiftly on an important "enemy" objective. The platoon commander explained the mission to the sergeants, requiring them to intensify their surveillance. The detachments reached a fork in the road at the appointed time and moved forward swiftly at the signal. Sergeant Bolotov, commander of the 3d Detachment, received

an order by radio to bypass the "enemy" on the left and attack his flank. Brush concealed the maneuver. On reaching the outskirts of the brush Bolotov suddenly spotted a fire support helicopter approaching. There was no time to report to the senior chief. He made his decision instantaneously. The range to the helicopter was about 900-1000 meters. Indicating the target, the sergeant concentrated the fire of the entire detachment against the aerial target, which was soon destroyed. It was not until this that the sergeant reported the results of his encounter with the airborne "enemy" to the platoon commander. Bolotov intensified surveillance over the airspace and continued on his mission.

Critiquing the lesson, Senior Lieutenant Zolotukhin laid special emphasis on the role Sergeant Bolotov played in the platoon's mission and noted his good tactical preparedness and his ability to orient himself in a complex situation and make the right decision quickly.

For sergeants of the subunit, this episode was an example of high combat skill, initiative, and outstanding mastery of entrusted combat equipment.

Airborne troops will often have to operate deep in the enemy rear during combat activity, when the ratio of forces is not always in their favor. A timely maneuver that is a surprise to the enemy acquires tremendous significance here. In all tactical lessons, the sergeants persistently improve their maneuvers as part of a company or a platoon and alone, learning how to make competent use of the enemy's flanks and intervals in his combat formations to achieve victory.

Here is an example. During a successful offensive an airborne paratrooper subunit was halted by intense antitank fire from a population center. One of the combat vehicles was "damaged." Further advance was impossible without reliable suppression of the antitank defenses. The senior chief gave the following mission to the commander of a platoon in which Sergeant N. Vorob'yev was performing the duties of the officer: Capitalizing on folds in the terrain that could not be seen by the "enemy" due to hills in the way, he was to covertly reach the defender's flank. The platoon completed its maneuver quickly and covertly. Scouts operating ahead reported that the "enemy" had failed to notice the maneuver. Sergeant Vorob'yev gave the command to prepare for the attack. On the company commander's signal the "enemy" was attacked from two directions, retreating from his line after suffering losses.

In the course of a battle not only a company and a platoon but also a detachment may have to perform a maneuver independently. This is why officers make improving the tactical knowledge and thinking of sergeants one of the goals of field exercises. This is precisely the situation in the subunit in which Sergeant V. Sychkov serves. During one exercise the platoon was given the mission of capturing a missile launcher. The commander competently organized reconnaissance and revealed the location

of the dangerous target. The beginning was successful. Further actions proceeded with lower success. The "enemy" resisted stubbornly, and the platoon was halted at a range of about 1000 meters. The launcher crew packed up and began moving to another area.

Assessing the situation quickly, the platoon commander decided to maneuver a detachment to the route of withdrawal of the missile launcher and seize or destroy it. This mission was given to Senior Sergeant Sychkov, an experienced commander. Competently orienting himself on the terrain and utilizing its relief, Sychkov led his detachment to the enemy's probable route of withdrawal. At this time the platoon was battling the rear guard, and therefore the maneuver was unnoticed. After a few minutes the withdrawing "enemy" column appeared. Sychkov's detachment subjected the "enemy" column to surprise fire at close range, placing priority on destroying the missile launcher. The platoon completed its mission successfully.

Great losses of personnel are not excluded in modern warfare. This is why airborne sergeants are taught to perform the duties of officers if the situation requires, assume firm control, and lead the battle. This is a complex task, and all sergeants must train for it in all exercises without exception. Subunit commanders often order an experienced, well-trained sergeant to conduct platoon training under the direct guidance of an officer. This produces good results: The sergeant's ability to command improves, and his capabilities for controlling the platoon and nurturing a feeling of independence increase.

In a tactical exercise of the past, after completing its immediate mission a parachute landing platoon was performing reconnaissance as a battallion combat reconnaissance patrol. On reaching the road edge it was attacked by a fire support helicopter. The platoon commander's vehicle was "destroyed." Detachment commander Sergeant Fisenko kept his self-control in the resulting situation and confidently assumed command of the platoon. He ordered the men to take shelter quickly to avoid the helicopter and concentrated their fire on the aerial target, destroying it. Under the Sergeant's command the platoon continued on its mission.

An important place is given in tactical training for sergeants to implementing the principle "Teach the troops what they would need in real battle." For this purpose a situation is created in exercises as close to real battle as possible, requiring the students to exert the force of their will and surmount moral and psychological difficulties. In such exercises commanders get practice in working with communication resources and controlling a subunit. The personnel learn to observe the battlefield, select their places for fire, attack, fire from different positions, correctly select their directions of fire, and surmount various obstacles, barricades, fires, contaminated terrain, and flooded areas. Exercises are often accompanied by sound effects. The noises of battle are trans-

mitted by a loudspeaker: The sounds of artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry weapon fire and the explosions of mortar shells, gunshells, and bombs are broadcasted. All of this helps to heighten the psychological stability of the soldiers. In addition a steel wire of which none of the attackers are aware is stretched 8-10 cm above the ground. Tripping over the wire, some sergeants and enlisted men fall during the attack. A person who falls on the battlefield ("detonates" a mine) is said to be "killed" or "wounded." Thus the exercise situation is made to resemble real battle as closely as possible.

Independent work has a great role in the training of paratrooper sergeants. Much attention is turned to this in all airborne subunits. Each day sergeants engage in independent training for 2 hours under the guidance of experienced officers. They study the statutes of the manuals and regulations, they learn the organization and armament of the probable enemy's army, and they practice assigning missions and issuing the instructions necessary for fire control.

Sergeants--the closest, reliable assistants to officers--are obligated to constantly improve their military and political knowledge, untiringly strengthen military discipline, and increase the degree of organization and coordination of subunits.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1978

11004

CSO: 1801

WORK OF VETERAN DIVER RECOUNTED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 Jul 78 pp 22-23

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Zhichkin, Twice-Awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "I Will Go First..."]

[Text] The rescue vessel was making preparations for sea. Diving operations were to be performed on a ship that had been sunk during the war. Seamen were working on the deck. Among them on the quarterdeck was a broad-shouldered warrant officer of medium height; from his bearing one could see that he was the man in charge.

"This is one of our best divers," the commander introduced the warrant officer.

"Team Chief Nikolay Yakovlevich Lugovskoy....he's been diving for 20 years...."

Shaking hands, the warrant officer smiled:

"Well, almost 20, Comrade Captain 3d Rank, this year will be 20...."

"It's an anniversary, then?"

"Yes, sir. But it's not the only one: I'll be turning 40, and I'm reaching the 3000 hour diving mark. It's a good time to celebrate." After a minute of silence he added, flashing his grey eyes slyly: "Unless of course you send me out to sea again...."

The commander laughed:

"Sorry about that, Comrade Lugovskoy, but that's your job. Always facing emergencies."

These words precisely describe one of the most important aspects of the warrant officer's specialty: He is always where there can be no delays. His diving log bears the notation: "Certified for ammunition search and recovery."

As a rule ammunition is always sunken near the shore, beside moorings, within harbors and ports. Visibility in such places is zero, and the diver must work with only his tactile senses to guide him.

Of course Lugovskoy works with his comrades, his subordinates when searching for mines and artillery shells. With some he works as an equal and others he leads. I was particularly interested in how the warrant officer--the team chief--associates with the divers, how he encourages them to do outstanding work under water, and how he teaches them. The unit commander said that Lugovskoy teaches 5 to 8 1st class divers each year. This is a lot. In 20 years the man had taught more than a hundred to assault the depths!

To get deeper information about this subject I sequestered myself with Nikolay Yakovlevich in the diver training office.

"This is a better place," the warrant officer said. "If I need to show you something, everything is at hand...."

The office was, so to speak, brim full with diving gear of all sorts. Diving suits stood at attention along the walls, apparatus was all over the tables, and the walls were covered with diagrams, descriptions, and instructions. The warrant officer later turned to them frequently to illustrate one incident or another in his experience.

"The initial stage in training young people to work with ammunition," Lugovskoy began his story, "is moral-psychological training. Everyone knows that this is a hazardous job. But not everyone is fully aware that anyone can do it if he has a good grasp of his equipment. This is the idea I constantly press home."

"In what ways?"

"In different ways depending on the circumstances...."

Discussions, stories told to the young divers about instructive incidents, recollections from personal experience and from the experience of other diving aces--all of this is within the educational arsenal of the team chief. The warrant officer listed the names of the seamen with whom he had talked, those whom he had under his command, those needing encouragement, and those having doubts that had to be dispelled.

"But the main thing in a dangerous situation," he said with strong conviction, "is personal example. The seaman must clearly see that you yourself are not scared, that there is not even a shadow of fear in your eyes. Dangerous? Then go first!"

"Have you had occasion to go first, Nikolay Yakovlevich?"

"Have I ever?!"

It happened on the Daugava River. A dredger hooked a mine which, it turned out later, was of a unique design: A ton of explosives in a capsule covered with wood. Lugovskoy dove to the bottom to examine the "treasure" (at that time he was the chief of a diver motorboat). The water was turbid, and nothing could be seen. He passed his fingers over the mine, centimeter by centimeter. After a while he discovered another mine. He carefully examined it as well. There could be no doubt: He had never come across something like this before. Surfacing, the warrant officer described his observations to the experts.

"This is a very dangerous thing," the major, a demolition expert, concluded. "There should be a 'whisker'--a thin wire--protruding from the wooden shell. Do not touch it!"

"No sir, I won't!" Lugovskoy said.

His subordinates were there as well, and they had heard the major too (they had to know everything about the forthcoming work!); the warrant officer began briefing them, preparing them for the dive. Suddenly one of the seamen doubled over holding his middle in pain.

"What's the matter?"

"It hurts...."

Lugovskoy fixed his gaze on the seaman. The latter lowered his eyes. He looked at the others--embarrassed faces....

Lugovskoy responded immediately:

"Well, if it hurts, go on down to sick bay. I'm going under water."

"Request permission to come along," one of the divers said, and then another....

"Good!" the warrant officer's face softened. "Let's go to work!"

The divers labored for a long time, cautiously, remembering the wires; they cleared the dirt from the mines and secured them with cables. They breathed easy only after the two "treasures" were lying on soft bedding on the deck of the self-powered barge.

"But what about the patient?" I asked the warrant officer.

Nikolay Yakovlevich went on with a smile:

"He recovered....He retired into the reserves with a thousand thanks. I still get letters from him now; he is working as a diver, and he is grateful for what he learned. Incidentally," the warrant officer's smile faded away as he went on, "cases of obvious panic are rare. Usually a person would display a lack of confidence in his strengths. There is only one reason for this--low proficiency. Not enough dexterity or skill. And these do not come right away. They need time. And a person ready to help out, to teach must always be present."

The warrant officer himself is one of those who is always there, always ready to teach. His deep knowledge of the fine points of diving helps him to discover the slightest deviations in a specialist's work in time, and to suggest ways to correct his mistakes.

Once the team was raising ammunition from a fascist self-powered barge that had been sunk during the war. Everything was proceeding normally. But when one of the divers took off his suit the warrant officer noticed that he was covered with sweat.

"How do you feel?" he asked the seaman, though he knew what had put the seaman in such a state.

"O.K., Comrade Warrant Officer!"

"Not quite," the team chief shook his head. "Do you know why you are all covered with sweat? No? Then listen. Last time you couldn't stay down--there was too much air in your suit. This time you decided to keep yourself on the bottom no matter what. That's good, you did well. You should be persistent. But did you have to purge your air until there was almost none left? What you needed was the happy medium, but you went from one extreme to the other. As a result you placed yourself under stress...."

The seaman listened in amazement: The warrant officer had read his thoughts as if he were in his shoes.

"That is exactly what happened, I was afraid to surface again," he said.

"This is the way it should be done...," and the team chief described the secret of his proficiency in detail.

Lessons in the specialty proceed and the divers undergo training in organized fashion in the subunit. But still, the principal source of knowledge is in practical work side by side with experts such as Nikolay

Yakovlevich. Even an incomplete list of the ammunition recovery jobs in which he had participated would attest to the richness of his experience:

A month and a half of searching for and recovering shells, grenades, and bombs from the bottom of Saymenskiy Canal.

"I was in charge of divers from another unit there," the warrant officer recalled. "I was sent there alone. We found and recovered a few things: About 600 gunshells, several hundred grenades, about 5 mines I think...."

There was work on the Daugava--mines, shells....

There was the ammunition raised from the bottom of the port of Klaypeda....

"We dug through a lot of mud on the bottom. We covered 2000 square meters, bringing 16 mines out into the light of day, Lugovskoy described his work at Klaypeda.

He had recovered shells from barges, shells from sunken ships, shells from fascist transporters.

"There was another time," the warrant officer began modestly, as if about a routine job, "that we recovered 960 shells beside a pier. They were resting on the bottom in a stack, and a firing wire rose to the surface.... There have been so many, I can't remember them all," he added apologetically.

Recently Nikolay Yakovlevich visited one of the ports where he had formerly recovered mines dropped to the bottom by the fascists.

"The piers extended out to sea many hundreds of meters," he described. "Magnificent ships were standing there. I looked, and there was joy in my heart: The cranes were whining and flags were fluttering on the masts, thanks in part to my work. After all, had I not recovered those mines everything would have been blown sky high...."

The warrant officer is also happy that many students have followed his footsteps. His former subordinates are working under water at a number of the country's construction sites, erecting hydraulic engineering facilities. "Thank you, Comrade Warrant Officer," writes Senior Seaman (Reserve) Sergey Kandryukov, "for making a diver out of me. I am doing what I was trained to do." He receives many such letters. Senior Seaman A. Mandenkov and seamen G. Zubkov and N. Pogiba, whose diving logs bear the notation "Certified for ammunition search and recovery," are also grateful to their teacher. The teacher's work is perpetuated in the work of his students.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1978

DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICER TRAINING POLICIES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8 Aug 78 signed to press 21 Jul 78 pp 9-17

[Article by Lt Gen V. Rodin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Discipline is An Important Component of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The state of military discipline and the level of combat readiness are closely interrelated. Experience has proven that a subunit (podrazdeleniye) or unit (chast) which has good discipline, is prepared to perform the combat mission at the proper level. It is perfectly natural therefore that the struggle to strengthen and maintain a high level of military discipline is one of the most important areas of work on the part of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. This attention to military discipline results from the fact that it is an important component of combat skill and an important element in the formation of good fighting efficiency and morale in the servicemen.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin pointed out the need constantly to maintain a high level of discipline. Even while the 1st Red Army subunits were being formed he emphasized the fact that it is impossible to conduct a war and defeat an enemy without extremely strict discipline running through the army from top to bottom. As he worked out the basic principles of military organizational development he regarded military discipline as a part of state discipline. In his struggle against antiparty groupings V.I. Lenin fought for centralization in the army, and discipline, and spoke out against disorderly partisan work and anarchistic unruliness. "...We would not have created the Red Army without this iron discipline, would not have maintained the struggle for two years and in general would not have been able to withstand organized and united capital."¹

Discipline in our Armed Forces is based on a high level of political awareness on the part of the servicemen, a profound understanding of their military and patriotic duty and the international tasks of the Soviet people, and on selfless devotion to the cause of the Communist Party and personal responsibility for the defense of the socialist homeland. V.I. Lenin considered Soviet military discipline to be a qualitatively new and higher type of discipline.

In his speech closing the 9th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolshevik)], he said: "Devotion constitutes the main condition for the use and preservation of our strict discipline: all of the old means and sources of employing discipline have been destroyed, and we have based our work only on a high level of thoughtfulness and awareness."²

The Communist Party and Soviet Government have devoted unweakened attention to the strengthening of discipline and order since the very first days of the army and navy. For example, a decree adopted by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July 1918 on the organization of the Red Army pointed out that the new army must be built on the basis of iron revolutionary discipline. The citizen receiving a weapon from Soviet authorities to defend the interests of the working masses is obligated to subordinate himself entirely to the demands and orders of the commanders provided by it. Today, as the Party Program stresses, "The CPSU is doing everything possible to see that the Soviet Armed Forces form a precisely defined and smoothly functioning system, that they have a high level of organization and discipline, perform the tasks assigned them by the party, the government and the people in an exemplary manner, and that they be prepared to provide a devastating rebuff to the imperialist aggressors at any moment."³

Party discipline, which the communists instill in the ranks of military personnel, has an enormous effect on the development of aware military discipline. Forming the nucleus of the military collectives party organizations unite the personnel and provide a model in the observance of the requirements specified in the military oath and regulations. And this is natural: in order to expect others to observe discipline one must set a fitting example himself. Only in this case will party influence be truly effective. V.I. Lenin pointed out that "if we teach discipline conscientiously to the workers and peasants then we are obligated to begin with ourselves."⁴

In his memoirs titled "Malaya zemla" Comrade L.I. Brezhnev told clearly and with sincerity of the communist's great duty to set an example. In the "Pamyatnik desantniku" which he authored, for example, he states: "Comrade Communists!... You must be the first to enter battle and the last to withdraw. You are called to the front to indoctrinate the Red Army mass. However, you must be able at any minute to take up a rifle and to demonstrate by personal example that a communist is able not only to live nobly but also to die with dignity"!⁵

The political workers and communists have performed in this manner. Leonid Il'ich recalls that during the fighting for Novorossiysk a company of naval infantrymen had attacked fascist fortifications three times without success. The commander of that subunit created an assault group of volunteers. It included 11 men headed by company party organizer Valliulin and four other communists. They broke through the enemy's defense with a determined assault, and the fighting men poured through after them. At the end of the street, however, they were halted by flanking fire. "Then," writes Comrade L.I.

Brezhnev, "Valliulin said to Master Sergeant D'yachenko: 'when the machine-gun falls silent, rally the men for an attack'. And he crawled away. He was struck down directly in front of the basement window from which the machine-gun fire was coming. The bloodied comrade threw himself in front of the window, however. The position was captured."⁶

Is this not the highest manifestation of awareness and discipline in the performance of military duty!?

Leninist concepts and party demands form the basis of regulations governing the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The Disciplinary Code states the following, for example: "...military discipline is the strict and precise observance of the procedure and regulations established by Soviet laws and military manuals on the part of all servicemen ...".

Military discipline is based on an awareness by every serviceman of his military duty and personal responsibility to defend his homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁷ The main purpose of regulations is that of achieving a situation in which every serviceman is fully aware of his role as an armed defender of the homeland, in which he observes Soviet laws strictly, fulfills the requirements contained in the military oath and military manuals, and the orders and instructions issued by commanders and chiefs, precisely and unconditionally, feels responsible for the homeland's security and is always prepared to perform any task assigned him. A fighting man's high level of discipline thus reflects his ideological conviction and a profound understanding of his patriotic duty and international tasks, as well as his moral qualities. Commanders, political organs and party organizations must therefore constantly indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of great awareness of their duty and personal responsibility for the homeland's defense. The task is one of using every form of party-political work to achieve a profound understanding by the fighting men of the need for discipline, the exceptional importance for the homeland's security of precise and strict observance of the requirements contained in manuals and instructions, and orders from commanders and chiefs.

"The tasks involved in strengthening discipline," notes Army General A.A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, "insistently dictate the need to delve thoughtfully and thoroughly into the system of indoctrinational and organizational work in the subunits themselves, primarily those with poor discipline, and to raise this work to the level of modern demands."⁸

Strict order is achieved in the army by a high level of demandingness on the part of single commanders and their personal organization. Only on the basis of sole responsibility can we provide strict unity of the will and actions of the personnel, and discipline of the strength required by modern warfare.

Experience has taught us that military discipline and combat readiness are maintained on the proper level wherever constant and thorough clarification of Leninist concepts of discipline is carried out in a closely coordinated manner, where the leader's precepts are implemented consistently and persistently with focused political indoctrinational and organizational work, where demandingness is combined with concern for the men. Indoctrinational work is skillfully organized, for example, in the regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel V.T. Sosnitskiy is deputy commander for political affairs. Literally every measure carried out with all categories of servicemen there is imbued with concern for strengthening discipline. Commanders, political workers and communists approach ideological indoctrinational and organizational work to strengthen discipline in a differentiated manner, not ignoring a single aspect. The members of report and lecture groups have recently stepped up their work in the unit markedly. Fulfilling the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on improving propaganda lectures, they attempt to expand the group of subjects covered in the presentations, to work out problems thoroughly, and to reveal the essence of the issues discussed as clearly, intelligibly and persuasively as possible. In the lectures, reports and talks supervisory personnel, supernumerary propagandists and all activists devote special attention to discipline as the most important component of combat readiness. This is only natural, since not a single problem of combat readiness can be resolved without strong discipline, precision, good performance, self-discipline and organization. Success in the development of good fighting efficiency and morale in the personnel, in the accomplishment of combat and political training tasks and the maintenance of equipment and weapons in a state of repair is inconceivable without them.

The goal of political indoctrinational work in the regiment is to see that each serviceman is thoroughly aware of the importance of collective discipline and his personal responsibility for the performance of his duties. In the first place, there is concern in the unit for strengthening the ideological-political caliber of the indoctrinating officers themselves. In the work conducted with them an important place is given over to the study of regulations and propaganda of the principles of Soviet military psychology and pedagogy, and Soviet military legislation. Members of the party bureau headed by Major Ya. N. Glevich constantly delve into the essence of these matters, enriching the experience of the best indoctrinators. Theoretical conferences on the subjects "V.I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Role of Regular Military Personnel in the Indoctrination of the Fighting Men" and "Organizing Party-Political Work to Indoctrinate the Men in a Spirit of Military Comradeship, Solidarity, Efficient Performance and a High Level of Discipline," for example, are conducted in an interesting manner and on a high ideological level.

As they analyze the results of exercises, firing practice and drills the commanders, political workers and activists devote a great deal of attention to the contribution made by each soldier, sergeant, warrant officer (praporshchik) and officer to the collective success. Teams and platoons discuss responsible impending tasks and the results of their performance. Before departing for the field or a training center the team commanders, gunners and

other gun crew members have a good understanding of what they must do in order to perform the missions successfully. In all of this work consideration is mainly given to the fact that discipline in the contemporary situation is of a clearly defined collective nature.

Special attention is devoted to discipline with respect to time. The new weapons and modern equipment make it necessary to consider not only hours and minutes, but even the seconds and split seconds. The time element is becoming an increasingly important factor in the achievement of victory over the enemy, and it is sometimes the decisive factor. It is with good reason therefore that the entire training process is imbued with the development of time discipline in the Guards Orsha Orders of Kutuzov and Aleksandr Nevskiy Fighter Regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Salayev, with Guards Major N.P. Levchenko as chief of the political section.

In that regiment a creative approach is taken to the resolution of any question pertaining to the organization and conduct of flights and ground training and to insuring flight safety. The final result of this work is the fact that the operations are performed irreproachably and strictly within the established period by the airman or air specialist.

All of the actions of each fighting man must be imbued with time discipline. For example, competition for the best achievements in fire training with the slogan "With the First Shots, the First Round, At Maximum Range!" was launched among district forces at the initiative of personnel in the company commanded by Guards Captain N. Grishin. The struggle to achieve firing accuracy is also based on time discipline. And the course of this competition was recently reviewed at a meeting of the district military council from precisely this point of view.

The general concept of discipline also includes combat duty discipline, that extremely important element which has a direct effect on combat readiness. Problems pertaining to discipline receive the most careful consideration by command, political workers and communists of the fighter unit. The most diverse forms and methods of indoctrinational work are used there, and particular note should be made of the development of vigilance in the regiment's combat traditions. Such forms as roll-calls of the generations are practiced there, for example. The unit is regularly visited by veterinarians and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Airmen, engineering and technical personnel jointly discuss combat incidents, the results of tactical flight exercises and problems of organizing party-political work under the most diverse conditions. Recommendations are worked out on this basis for the practical adoption of progressive new methods of political indoctrination.

The agendas for party meetings regularly include problems pertaining to combat and guard duty and to administration within the unit. Entries in the duty log and guard reports — "No remarks" — attest to the effectiveness of all this work.

The element of technical discipline should also be singled out. It requires maintaining the weapons and combat equipment in a state of constant combat readiness. The procedure for storing, servicing and operating the equipment and its combat employment is defined in manuals, orders and instructions. Inefficiency and the violation of regulations cannot help influencing the quality of its preparation.

Nor can I fail to mention the element of troop control discipline. It is with good reason that the primary task in armed confrontation is that of disrupting the normal operation of the enemy's troop and weapons control facilities. A great deal depends on the level of discipline of personnel manning the various control systems. This is taken into account in exercises and drills conducted in a situation approaching actual combat conditions to the maximum possible degree, in which the most efficient methods of using communications equipment are worked out. This is a very important matter. Rigid discipline, precision and efficiency are required in order to increase the flow of information.

Finally, I would like to stress training discipline especially. Its level is directly dependent on the conscientiousness and discipline of the commander himself. A single principle is involved: to teach that which is essential in a war. In the training process some officers unfortunately deviate from the requirements laid out in the combat training programs and schedules. The subjects of some field exercises are worked out in the classroom. There are still cases of indulgence and oversimplification, which has negative effects on the fighting men's attitude toward the subject covered, and, in the final analysis, on the state of discipline. The struggle against these and other deficiencies forms an independent area of work for political organs and party organizations. During the winter training period party committees and bureaus heard reports at their meetings from the communists in charge of organizing and directing exercises far more frequently than before. A graphic example of this is the Orsha Fighter Regiment. At one time there was a certain deterioration in the regiment, and the unit began to give up its positions. Thanks to determined measures performed by the commander and to the militancy of the political organ and party organizations, however, the regiment managed not only to regain its position, but even advanced considerably.

The party considers discipline to be one of the most important conditions for the successful building of communism. In his speech at the December (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out that the most important aspect of our work is "the highest possible degree of organization, order and discipline in all areas, in all sectors of administrative work — labor discipline, technological discipline and plan discipline. Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations, together with the administration, are expected to create the required public-political climate for this at each enterprise, in each collective. A climate which will produce a desire to work better, more efficiently and more productively, and an atmosphere of intolerance for violators of discipline. The measure of responsibility for the irreproachable performance of each assignment and for the strictest possible observance of plan discipline by production leaders at all levels is especially great."⁹

This requirement also emerges from decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, which noted the following: "We must strive to establish an authentic party style of work in all administrative work, to increase the responsibility of all workers for the fulfillment of plan assignments, strengthen discipline and improve the monitoring of performance."¹⁰

The party's instructions also fully apply to us. Commanders, political workers and communists conduct the struggle for firm military discipline from two main key positions, which are raising the level of military organization to that of the requirements made of the Armed Forces of the USSR by the party: on the one hand, they develop a communist outlook, a high level of awareness and profound conviction of the need for iron discipline in the fighting men, and on the other, they conduct organizational work, constantly infusing the Leninist style into it.

Experience has shown that the requirements of Soviet military discipline have become the standard of conduct for servicemen in those units and subunits in which not a single serviceman is left outside the sphere of constant political influence, in which the Leninist style of work is persistently instilled, and in which purposeful political indoctrinational work is conducted among the personnel. An analysis of the work of the communications regiment in which Major Yu. A. Strashnikov is the secretary of the party committee will convince one of this. In that regiment one senses a solid party influence throughout.

The indoctrinational role of socialist competition and its moral aspects stand out in the example of that regiment. In the struggle to fulfill socialist commitments the fighting men not only improve their training, but also grow spiritually, strengthen their character and strive for undeviating fulfillment of the requirements laid out in the moral code for a builder of communism. A broad plan of legal indoctrination measures is rigorously implemented. Work conducted with officers and sergeants, with materially responsible individuals, military drivers and vehicle commanders, is defined and carried out separately. A special book exhibit "For the Fighting Man On Discipline, Friendship and Military Comradeship" has been set up in the library. A point of interest is the fact that readers' conferences, with the participation of members of the party committee, the party bureau and the library council, have been moved from the reading room and club to the companies themselves, where the subject discussed is closely linked to the life of the personnel and the conduct of the servicemen.

A new surge of effort was evoked in the fighting men by a readers' conference on the books written by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev: "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye." A readers' conference for officers on the novel "Vechnyy boy" written by V. Karpov, former Turkestan officer, turned into an extensive and animated discussion.

Meetings with war and labor veterans and shock workers of the first years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, exposure to their feats, and a thorough acquaintance with combat traditions all leave a considerable mark in the hearts of the fighting men and create a desire to heroes. It is interesting that it was in this regiment that the experienced soldiers in the company commanded by Captain D.V. Grigor'yev initiated a patriotic movement, "All of My Knowledge and Skill — For You, Young Fighter!", which was taken up and received the broad support of district troops.

The communist officers thoroughly study the work and the moral qualities of their men, understanding that focused, individual indoctrinational work can only be performed on this basis. An in-depth analyzis and an objective appraisal of the state of discipline, the strengthening of the sole responsibility and leadership of the Komsomol, thoroughly considered party-political work and skillful placement of personnel have been a guarantee of firm military discipline in the outstanding collectives.

A powerful incentive to strengthen political-indoctrinational work was provided by the Letter From the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee On The Development of Socialist Competition in 1978. It was discussed in all subunits and evoked a fervent response on the part of Turkestan's fighting men. In the work performed to develop socialist competition party and Komsomol activists made skillful use of preparations for important dates in the life of the nation, the army and the Komsomol. "A Fitting Reception for the Anniversary of the Armed Forces and the District!", "Not A Single Laggard Alongside!", "60 Shock-Labor Weeks For the 60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces," and "Eighteen Shock Watches For the 18th Komsomol Congress" — the Turkestan people lived, worked and competed under these and many other slogans. A movement for good results in training and discipline in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol has now been initiated among the fighting men of our district. Attempting to achieve new heights in their combat skill, they are increasing their political knowledge and their ideological strength, which forms the basis for discipline and success in combat and political training. This work is producing gratifying results. In the communications regiment, for example, 93 percent of the personnel are rated specialists and two-thirds of the communists distinguished themselves in the training, with 95 percent of them classified as specialists.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has stressed the fact that improvement of labor discipline constitutes a reserve which does not require capital investments but can produce a large and rapid return. The efforts of district commanders, political workers and all communists are focused on implementing these instructions in our life and our daily work, on the activation of that powerful reserve for improving combat readiness, discipline in all its aspects.

"Our nation, the Soviet Union," said Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in a West German television broadcast, "sees its most important purpose in international affairs as one of preventing mankind from slipping toward war, of protecting and strengthening peace, universal, just and permanent."¹¹

The Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of nations forming the socialist commonwealth, which are a reliable bulwark of peace and which must always be in a state of readiness to come to its defense, play an enormous role in the struggle to achieve this goal.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 40, pp 117-118.
2. Ibid, p 282.
3. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 111.
4. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" Vol. 50, p 63.
5. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 32.
6. Ibid, pp 36-37.
7. "Obshchevoinskiye ustavy Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [General Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces," Voyenizdat, 1977, p 172.
8. A.A. Yepishev, "Moguchye oruzhiye partii" [A Powerful Party Weapon], Voyenizdat, 1973, p 221.
9. PRAVDA, 18 December 1977.
10. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 237.
11. PRAVDA, 7 May 1978.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1978

11499
CSO: 1801

METHODS OF ATTAINING GOOD DISCIPLINE DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
21 Jul 78 pp 18-24

[Article by Col Gen V. Goncharov, first deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Minister of Defense: "The Constitution of the USSR and the Training of Military Personnel"]

[Text] Last year went down in the history of our planet as the 60th anniversary of the world's first Soviet Socialist State. It arrived illuminated by the brilliant light cast by the new Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of a Developed Socialist Nation.

The history of our nation, the creation, development and perfection of the structure of the Armed Forces, and the organization of military personnel training have convincingly demonstrated the enormous scientific-theoretical and practical work performed by the CPSU and V.I. Lenin in this area. Vladimir Il'ich worked out and provided the scientific basis for the military program of proletarian revolution, created an orderly doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland, revealed the political nature and peculiarities of wars fought to defend the conquests of socialism, and pointed out the historic importance of the proletarian army. While at the helm of the party and state, he performed the enormous job of creating the Red Army and the training and indoctrination of military personnel during the very first days of the young Soviet Republic's existence.

The draft of the first Soviet Constitution, which was adopted by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July 1918, was worked out under V.I. Lenin's supervision and with his most active participation. It consolidated legally the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution — the abolition of capitalist and landowner property holdings and equality for the peoples of Russia — proclaimed a struggle for peace among nations and gave all workers a part in the control of the state.

The Constitution of the RSFSR attached special importance to the citizens' duty to defend the socialist homeland. The principle of compulsory military service was established by law in the RSFSR, although the honored right to defend the cause of the revolution with weapons was only extended to the workers. The nonworking elements were assigned other tasks. Therein was manifested the class approach taken to the formation of the Armed Forces of the young Soviet Republic.

Control and supervision of the troops naturally required command personnel. Their training involved enormous difficulties, which were created by intervention and civil war.

The party created military personnel for a new type of army, advancing to command positions those communists who were familiar with military affairs and had received combat experience in the Red Guard, as well as soldiers and sailors devoted to the revolution and with combat experience as noncommissioned officers in the old army. An entire system of courses and schools was created, and the foundations were laid for the higher military training institutions. At V.I. Lenin's instruction former generals and officers of the old army who had expressed a readiness to serve the new system were taken into the Red Army and Navy.

V.I. Lenin and the party assigned the commissars an enormous role in the training, placement and indoctrination of military personnel. The red officers matured rapidly in the fighting for Soviet power. A group of brilliant military leaders grew, men who skillfully personified the strategic plans of V.I. Lenin and the higher military leadership. Among these were M.V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S.M. Budennyy, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, A.I. Yegorov, V.K. Blyukher and others.

The basic principles of military organizational development adopted at the initiative of V.I. Lenin and consolidated by the Constitution of the RSFSR thus contributed to the creation of a proletarian, politically aware nucleus in the Red Army, to its victories over the white guards and interventionists, and to the transition to the building of a regular Armed Forces.

In 1924 the 2d All-Russian Council of Soviets adopted the Constitution of the USSR, which legally consolidated the principles involved in the building of the world's first multinational, socialist Union state.

During the period of reconstruction national defense matters continued to be at the center of the party's attention. The Red Army's organizational development was carried out on a higher organizational level, under new circumstances, and taking civil war experience into account. The military reform of 1924-25 contributed to this. Carried out under party and government control, it put into order the training system for regular military personnel, stabilized their composition and helped to strengthen the party-political apparatus and to improve indoctrinational work in the army and navy.

Of exceptional importance in the work carried out with military cadres were the Statute on Service in the War Department adopted in 1924 and the Statute on the Service of Middle, Senior and Higher Command Personnel of the RKKA in Peacetime placed into effect by an order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in July 1928, which were developed in accordance with the Constitution. These documents defined fairly clearly and extensively the basic rules and terms of service for command personnel and the maximum and minimum periods of service in each position. The role of officer certification increased.

The Law on Compulsory Military Service for Citizens Between the Ages of 19 and 40, adopted in September 1925 by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, was an important event in the life of the nation and expanded the training base for military personnel.

Socialism had gained its victory in the USSR by the middle of the 1930's. The complicated economic structure was eliminated, unemployment was ended, and the social-political and ideological unity of the people was established, as was close friendship and fraternal cooperation among the socialist nations. The new Constitution of the USSR adopted by the Extraordinary 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1936 summed up and consolidated legislatively these historic accomplishments of the Soviet people and the profound social-political, economic and spiritual changes occurring as a result of socialism's victory. The Constitution established compulsory military duty, and military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR was declared the honored duty of USSR citizens. The new Law on Compulsory Military Duty, adopted in 1939 on the basis of the Constitution, removed previously existing class restrictions in the military service and established the regular-personnel principle in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. This was of enormous importance for further strengthening and building up the regular military forces.

We were forced to build socialism in a difficult international situation. Encouraged and nurtured by imperialists of the U.S.A., England and France, German fascism raised its head, and its hordes were trampling on the nations of Europe with impunity. Japanese militarists were attempting to probe our strength. All of this made it necessary for the Soviet people to take decisive steps to strengthen the homeland's defense capability.

The successes achieved by our socialist economy permitted our Armed Forces to receive new types of weapons and combat equipment. The numerical strength of the army and navy increased. This resulted in increased requirements of command, political, engineering and other personnel. Until 1941 they were intensively trained in various types of secondary military schools, at higher naval schools, in military academies and in the military departments of civilian VUZ's. Military personnel were successfully indoctrinated ideologically and politically in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, devotion to the homeland and the cause of communism, and loyalty to the military oath.

The regular personnel improved each year. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War 80.6 percent of the officers were communists or Komsomol members, 63 percent had a higher or secondary military education, and 85 percent of them were below the age of 35. Representatives of more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups populating the USSR served in the army and navy.

The Constitution of 1936 consequently played an important role in preparing the Armed Forces and their regular personnel for the struggle against fascism.

During the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet people demonstrated a high level of political awareness, loyalty to the Constitution and undeviating resolve to defend the conquest of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Hundreds and thousands of our fighting men set examples of unprecedented steadfastness, courage and heroism in all stages of the last war. More than 11,000 men were awarded the prestigious title Hero of the Soviet Union, and 104 of them were awarded the title twice. During the war twice this title was conferred upon four-time Hero of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov¹; I.N. Kozhedub and A.I. Pokryshkin were awarded the order three times. Regiments and divisions were awarded orders 10,900 times. The names of hundreds of fighting men were entered for eternity in the rosters of army and navy units.

One of the difficult problems which the party was forced to resolve during the war years was that of training regular officers. The problem was especially acute in the first months of the war, when the enemy took advantage of temporary superiority and penetrated deeply into our homeland. Within a limited time the party had organized the training of commanders to build up the fronts and replace casualties.

The system of military training institutions had to be expanded and their capacities increased immediately. This made it possible to send nearly a quarter of a million officers into the field armies by the end of 1941. Courses for junior lieutenants staffed by soldiers and sergeants who had distinguished themselves in combat were created at military training institutions and at front and army headquarters. The party mobilized its best sons for the front. Thousands of leading party workers were sent into the field army. During the war years officers were trained by a total of 31 higher military training institutions, 220 secondary military schools and more than 200 various courses, which made it possible to turn out 400,000 to 500,000 officers annually. A large reserve of personnel was created. The party advanced and indoctrinated many talented unit (chasti, soyedineniye) commanders and outstanding Soviet military leaders. The names G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, K.K. Rokossovskiy, I.S. Konev and others are known throughout the world.

In fierce battles with the enemy the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of their socialist homeland and made a decisive contribution to the rescue of European and world civilization from fascism. This strengthened the international prestige of the USSR and opened up paths for the growth and strengthening of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy and peace throughout the world.

Our nation has lived without war for 33 years now. The Armed Forces of the USSR, guided by the party, vigilantly guard the interests of the Soviet State, nations of the socialist commonwealth and all progressive mankind.

On 7 October 1977 a special, seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the new Constitution, the Fundamental Law of the Soviet State of all the people, which consolidated the building of a developed socialist society in our nation.

The role of the CPSU as the guiding and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, a role established by the Constitution, is a very important and fundamental principle for the building of communism and for the defense of its conquests.

This is the basic principle involved in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. Problems of the nation's defense capability and improvement of its army and navy receive constant attention from the CPSU. Problems of equipping the Armed Forces with new types of weapons and combat equipment, improving the organizational structure, training regular personnel, improving the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and so forth are resolved by the wisdom, perspicacity and will of the party and its Leninist Central Committee.

Communists and Komsomol members account for the vast majority of regular military personnel. All unit commanders are members of the CPSU, and the number of communists in command of companies, batteries and their equivalents is increasing each year. Party-political work is a proven method of successfully accomplishing the tasks facing the army and navy, including the priority task of collecting, placing and indoctrinating regular personnel.

The new Fundamental Law strengthens the common, general-state nature of the nation's defense in the contemporary situation. Article 31 of the Constitution of the USSR states: "Defense of the socialist homeland is among the most important functions of the state and is the affair of all the people."

Article 62 proclaims the following: "Defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of each citizen of the USSR." Article 63 legally establishes a sacred tradition achieved by the entire life and struggle of our people: "Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honored duty of Soviet citizens." These articles of the Constitution provide vast scope for the selection and training of regular personnel for the Armed Forces

from the people, from the best representatives of Soviet youth, who fervently desire to acquire the heroic vocation of an officer, to link their lives with the army for good. It is with good reason that competition for acceptance to VVUZ's [military higher educational institutions] is extremely great. The task is one of selecting, with the active participation of party, soviet and Komsomol organizations, the most worthy young people for training, those possessing all of the necessary qualities for future service in the army.

The officer corps clearly reflects the social basis of the USSR, an indestructible alliance of the working class, peasants and intelligentsia. It embodies the great conquest established in the Constitution of friendship of peoples and equal rights for USSR citizens of the various races and nationalities. Representatives of practically all our homeland's nationalities serve as commanders, political workers and engineers in the army and navy.

The Constitution charges the Armed Forces of the USSR with special responsibility for the nation's defense. "The Armed Forces have a duty to the people," Article 31 stresses, "to reliably defend the socialist homeland and to be in a constant state of combat readiness insuring an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

A high level of combat readiness is an objective and vital law of the Armed Forces. Describing the state of combat readiness, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, stresses the fact that combat readiness "is a fusion of the technical equipment of the troops, their combat training, moral-political, psychological and physical conditioning, organization, and the readiness of each Soviet fighting man to perform feats for the sake of performing their military duty to the homeland."²

The successful performance of this task, emphasizes the USSR minister of defense, requires constantly maintaining a situation in the army and navy, which gives the fighting men a feeling of great responsibility for the assigned job. Each general, admiral and officer, each communist in a supervisory position should be concerned by the state of the troops under his command, whether they are capable of executing combat orders immediately, and whether everything possible has been done in order for them to set about repelling any aggressor in an organized manner and reliably defending the homeland.

Consequently, the need for good combat readiness is formulated in a concrete form and pertains to each fighting man, first and foremost, to each officer, general and admiral. Our regular officers, their ideological-political qualities, fighting efficiency and morale, the level of their professional training, discipline and organization, and the state of their health unquestionably constitute one of the most important conditions for good combat readiness in the army and navy.

Thanks to the concern of the party and government, the entire Soviet people, profound qualitative changes are occurring in all of the activity of the army and navy, changes predetermining continued improvement of the training, indoctrination, selection and placement of officers.

The combat equipment which the army and navy are receiving makes it necessary to achieve a higher level of training for those servicing it. Most modern weapons are for group, collective use, and the successful performance of missions depends greatly on the skillful and determined actions of each fighting man, especially the officer in charge of the collective.

The dynamic nature and rapid progression of combat operations and the sharp increase in the power and combat capabilities of the weapons require that the organizers and leaders of battles and operations possess good professional training and the ability to direct subordinates in combat, to make competent decisions rapidly and bear responsibility for them. The latter requires good moral-psychological conditioning, spiritual strength and unshakeable faith in the correctness of our cause, and confidence in victory, a part of the officers.

The requirements made of indoctrinal work in the army and navy have increased considerably. They are organically linked with the building of the world's first developed socialist society in the USSR. A historic new community of people, the Soviet people, has developed in the USSR as a result of changes occurring in the social-class structure of its society. This is an important stage on the path toward the social homogeneity of Soviet society. The Armed Forces today is receiving literate youth, with great spiritual and intellectual needs, and highly erudite, and this cannot be ignored in the training and indoctrination of the men. The officer requires profound knowledge for this, and he must know the fundamentals of pedagogy and psychology.

Article 30 of the new Constitution points out that "as an integral part of the world system of socialism and the socialist commonwealth the USSR develops and strengthens friendship and cooperation, and comradely mutual assistance with the socialist nations, based on the principle of socialist internationalism..."

In all the stages of their development, the Soviet Armed Forces have performed a great mission of proletarian internationalism. They are today an integral part of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations, reliably defending the revolutionary conquests of the fraternal peoples, together with the armies of the socialist nations. This must unquestionably be reflected in the training of regular personnel.

All of the above-listed factors and others as well have made it necessary to further improve the structure of the officer corps and its orderly development. The role of the basic Leninist principles for the selection, placement and indoctrination of regular personnel has become even greater. The 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses made an enormous contribution to the development of the party's cadre policy. Advice, instructions and information provided by

L.I. Brezhnev in his books "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye" have been of inestimable importance for the training of regular personnel and for working with them. This is discussed with great interest at all scientific conferences, party meetings, aktivs and personnel meetings devoted to the works of L.I. Brezhnev.

At the July (1978) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee a great deal of attention was devoted to improving the work performed with regular personnel and to increasing their discipline and responsibility.

No matter what aspect of the training of regular military personnel we consider, it is solidly based on the Constitution. The requirements which the Constitution makes of the education of Soviet people who train regular personnel in the Armed Forces, for example, are not just strictly fulfilled, they are actually exceeded. Suffice it to say that more than 56 percent of the officers now have a higher military or special military education, and practically all officers have a secondary education.

Almost all military schools have now become higher schools; the training system at military academies is being improved; and new forms are being used to train officers who already have a higher military education. Important decisions have been adopted to improve the educational-indoctrinal process at VVUZ's, to strengthen the group of regular instructors and create the training materials base. This is all being done in order to fill the army and navy, in an orderly and consistent manner and in accordance with military science and the achievements of military art, with highly skilled command, political, engineering and other regular personnel with ideological conviction, devoted to the cause of communism and capable of successfully performing missions both in peacetime and in time of war.

Service in the forces, exercises, cruises and flights, in which the knowledge of the officers is improved and their practical skills refined, unquestionably constitute the main school for the formation, growth and development of regular personnel.

The successful development of graduates from military educational institutions and officers appointed to higher posts is without a doubt directly dependent on their personal qualities, their effort and diligence in mastering their job. The decisive role, however, belongs to the senior commanders and chiefs, to their ability, patiently to teach their subordinates and impart their knowledge and experience to them.

It should be frankly stated, however, that there are deficiencies in this area. Certain young officers are slow to master the modern methods of training and indoctrination, while others give up in the face of difficulties. Senior commanders and chiefs are sometimes overly protective of the young officers, even in minor matters, especially during inspections and exercises. Instead of giving the young regimental or battalion commander the opportunity to command, to test his abilities, to demonstrate his capabilities, most all of the higher staff officers sometimes attempt to perform their duties for them.

Purely bureaucratic administration and unjustified punishment of young officers have become solidly entrenched in the work of certain commanders and chiefs. The harm caused by this is apparent. They must know how to seek and find the good in an individual, to develop and encourage his good endeavors. They should especially not mix demandingness with crudeness and a lack of tact.

The works of L.I. Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye," are now to be found on the officers desk. They illustrate with profound convincingness the sources of the Soviet people's patriotism and spiritual strength, which lie in the socialist structure and the leadership of the CPSU. L.I. Brezhnev's experience and instructions teach all of our cadres, including the regular military personnel, to master methods of indoctrinal work, to improve its style, to work with people in a creative manner, and to create an atmosphere of trust, respect and demandingness.

"Even when an individual makes a mistake," writes Leonid Il'ich, "no one has the right to insult him with loud abuse. I find the habit, although not widespread, still existing on the part of some, of raising ones voice at people deeply repulsive. Neither the administrative nor the party leader should ever forget that those under him are his subordinates only in the service, that they do not serve the director or manager but the cause of the party and the state. In this respect all people are equal."³

The obligation to deal respectfully with an individual is covered in the new Constitution of the USSR. "Respect for the individual, protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens," Article 57 states, "is the duty of all state agencies, public organizations and officials."

Strict observance of Chapter 7 of our new Constitution, "Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the USSR," has a direct effect on the training of regular personnel for the Armed Forces. This article has already mentioned certain aspects pertaining to the right to an education. While stressing the fact that the right to rest and relaxation, health protection, old age security, housing, and the benefit of cultural achievements is strictly observed in the work performed with regular military personnel and stimulates their training and work, I would like to make special note of Article 48, which states: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to participate in the running of state and public affairs, in the discussion and adoption of laws and decisions of local and general-state importance."

Fighting men of the army and navy took a most active part in the discussion of the new Constitution of the USSR. Together with all the people, they accepted the new Fundamental Law of our state with enormous political animation and enthusiasm, approved it unanimously, and fully support the Leninist course pursued by the Communist Party, its Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo, and the tireless and productive work performed by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and chairman of the Defense Council.

The Soviet fighting man performs his honored duty with complete awareness of his equality with other citizens, clearly understanding that military service is one of the forms of social-political work carried out for the good of society and in the interest of the people. The work performed by military personnel is as necessary to society as that performed by workers, kolkhoz workers and scientists, and it contributes to the continued flourishing and strengthening of the homeland's power. The servicemen's active participation in elections for central and local agencies of authority is a clear manifestation of Soviet democracy and the equality of citizens of the USSR. Many of them are deputies in the soviets. At the present time 56 servicemen have been elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 157 to the supreme soviets of union republics, 39 to autonomous republic supreme soviets, and more than 13,000 to local soviets.

Fighting men of the army and navy take a most active part in all public-political measures carried out in the nation and in the performance of important national economic tasks, such as the harvest, the building of the Baykal-Amur Trunk Line, and others, and in the work of various public organizations.

It should also be noted that observance of the constitutional right to the selection of a profession, type of occupation and work in accordance with ones calling, abilities, professional training and education, taking society's needs into account, is extremely important for the training of regular military personnel. Behind these concise definitions lies an enormous job pertaining to the staffing of VVUZ's, the distribution of officers, the ability to detect, support and develop people's abilities, and a great deal more. Strict observance of Article 26 of the Constitution pertaining to the planned development of science and the training of scientific workers is inseparable from all of this, since the training and work of military scientific personnel have a proper place in strengthening the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.

That chapter in the Constitution which affirms our nation's political system stresses the role of socialist competition. In their performance of the tasks involved in further proving the combat readiness of units and ships, commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations make extensive use of socialist competition, that powerful means of mobilizing and indoctrinating people. It assumed especially broad scope during the period of preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Strict observance of the Leninist principles of competition — publicity, comparability of results, the practical possibility of repeating an experience, efficiency and creativity, and support for everything new and progressive — is permitting our cadres to achieve new heights in combat perfection.

L.I. Brezhnev's meetings with soldiers of the Siberian, Transbaykal and Far East military districts and with sailors of the Pacific Fleet evoked great patriotic enthusiasm in the troops and a fervent desire to perform the assigned missions in the best possible manner. His instructions and recommendations presented in his meetings with the fighting men are imbued with the party's profound concern for the defenders of the conquests of socialism.

The party places great value on the valorous work of the homeland's soldiers. It is sufficient to point out, for example, that this year alone thousands of servicemen were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, that a number of military leaders were awarded the eminent title Hero of the Soviet Union, and many officers were awarded the next military ranks ahead of schedule. The conferring of the order "Victory" upon Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the National Defense Council was greeted with great satisfaction and pride by all Soviet fighting men.

There is no army in the world, in which its interests and those of the people merge to such an extent. Our Armed Forces have always been and remain a school of ideological and political tempering of the youth, a school for their maturation and the development of a high level of civic spirit.

"Speaking of indoctrinal work, comrades," L.I. Brezhnev stressed at the 25th party congress, "we cannot fail to mention that enormous role played by the Soviet Army in this matter. Young people join the family of soldiers without having gone through the school of life. When they return home from the army, however, they have already graduated from the school of endurance and discipline and have acquired technical and professional knowledge and political training."⁴

The army's role in the indoctrination of the youth was brilliantly clarified by L.I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress.

An important political campaign, the certification of officers, is now underway in the army and navy. It is designed to increase the contribution made by regular military personnel to the improvement of the combat readiness of the soldiers and sailors, to improve combat and political training and further strengthen the military discipline of the personnel, to improve the overall indoctrination of regular personnel and help to properly place and train the officers. And it is already producing good results.

It is essential to devote most careful attention to the certification process throughout, to observe all of the requirements and instructions established by the USSR minister of defense, and to prevent errors and omissions. It is no secret that some commanders and chiefs still study and know those undergoing certification poorly, permit formalism, demonstrate a lack of principle in evaluating the officers' qualities and merits, and do not justify their decisions with respect to certification. The opinion of the party organization and the officer collective is not always taken into account. Speaking of all this I would like to point out that certification is thoroughly constitutional in nature. It should essentially reflect the requirements made of the Armed Forces and their regular personnel by the Constitution. Both the individual performing the certification and the subject of the certification should analyze with a feeling of great responsibility the extent to which they are fulfilling the Fundamental Law of the Soviet State and do everything possible in order to actively implement it.

For 60 years the Soviet Armed Forces have served the people with trust and truth. Created by V.I. Lenin and the party, they have had a historic history, covering their fighting colors with immortal glory in battles for the homeland's freedom and independence. Today's generation of Soviet fighting men have something to defend and something with which to defend. Regarding their honored duty as the highest moral value, Soviet fighting men are doing everything possible to make the borders of the socialist homeland inaccessible to enemies. Together with their comrades-at-arms from the nations in the socialist commonwealth, they vigilantly guard peace in order, as Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said at a ceremonial meeting in Minsk for the awarding of the Order of Lenin and the "Cold Star" medal to the heroic city, "to prevent a flare-up of a new world war,"⁵ into which the militaristic imperialists are attempting to draw mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. He was awarded the first Gold Star on 29 August 1939, the fourth on 1 December 1956.
2. KOMMUNIST, No. 3, 1971, p 18.
3. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 26.
4. "Materialy XXV KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp 75-76.
5. PRAVDA, 26 June 1978.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1978

11499

CSO: 1801

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES AT TULA PLANT DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 78 p 2 LD

[Article by its own correspondent, Maj A. Khorunzhii: "Chief of Staff"]

[Text] An article summing up the training year in the civil defense system appeared in the Tula Priboy plant's large circulation newspaper. It criticised a number of leaders for paying inadequate attention to civil defense. It was written by Reserve Col I. Brazuyev, civil defense chief of staff. From early morning there were telephone calls to the author, the party committee secretary and the plant director.... Those who telephoned were bitterly offended at the criticism.

Recalling this incident, the Priboy plant director, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Makzhanov, could not help smiling.

"Some people even stopped greeting Bazuyev. It was necessary to explain to those comrades at a party committee session that Ivan Nikolayevich acted in a principled fashion and assessed the shortcomings in the party style."

"Bazuyev is sincerely devoted to his work, devotes all his effort and knowledge to it and has no patience with complacency toward questions which, let us say outright, are of state significance," party committee secretary Ivan Mefodiievich Mishustin said in support. "It is possible to say without exaggeration that the fact that our plant for 3 years in succession has been awarded the CPSU obkom and oblispolkom Red Banner for high indicators in socialist competition for the best work in the oblast civil defense system is primarily due to Ivan Nikolayevich Bazuyev."

The plant's veterans are the basis of the aktive which the site's civil defense chief of staff rallied round himself. When Bazuyev became the plant's civil defense chief of staff 5 years ago he had to start from nothing, so to speak.

It would be difficult to say how things would have gone if another person had come instead of Bazuyev. There were many difficulties. Ivan Nikolayevich was helped by having a wealth of experience of more than 30 years' service in the army. Life convinced him long ago that a leader's authority depends not

only on the level of his special training but also on his initiative, organizational abilities and his ability to inspire people and help them see the importance of work to be done.

Communist Bazuyev was strongly aware that his most reliable assistants would be party comrades--people who understand well the significance of civil defense for improving the country's defense capability.

Even now there are many veterans working at the plant who remember how, during the Great Patriotic War, fighting men of the local air defense subunits and formations under very grim conditions quickly put out fires and cleared up wreckage and damage, saved people's lives and continued working at their places of work. The names of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Ryazantsev, Vladimir Petrovich Sukhanov, Mustafa Bashirov and other veterans are spoken of with respect within the collective.

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Makzhanov, now the director of the Pribor plant, joined the plant as an adolescent during the war. Chief Mechanic Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kamayev began his career in 1942 as a trainee lathe operator. Many times he had to extinguish incendiary bombs while on duty in an air defense detachment. The ranks of the Tula worker's regiment included many Pribor workers who staunchly defended their native city. Situated near the front line, the plant repaired radio sets for military units and manufactured communication systems for air defense.

...How did the new chief of staff start out?

The party committee session discussed the state of civil defense at the plant and a long-term plan for improving it. Bazuyev delivered a report. His proposals sounded detailed and reasonable. "It is impossible to achieve a high standard of training in nonmilitarized [nevoyenizirovannyy] formations without a good material training base" was the logical conclusion which followed from the facts cited in the report.

The party committee members viewed the proposals with understanding and soon the necessary facilities were found and there was no shortcoming among Bazuyev's assistants. Front line Reserve Lieutenant Colonels V. Nechayev and A. Zhuravlev, Reserve Maj I. Shchikov, Reserve Captains L. Zhavoronkov and N. Chikov and other activists took an active part in creating a training methods center at the Palace of Culture. They were greatly helped by the plant's Komsomol members. In their free time they equipped the training classes and prepared visual aids. Thus the classes were formed in such a way that students could, by gradually moving from the simple to the difficult, study aspects of modern weapons, their casualty effects and principles of civil defense and individual and collective means of defense.

In order to attract the attention of plant workers and employees to questions of civil defense and to help them assimilate knowledge and skills, civil

defense corners have been created in all the shops. In response to a proposal from the party committee, adjustments were made in the work plans of party and Komsomol organizations which made it possible to step up the military and patriotic education of young people.

Personal participation in the elucidatory and organizational work of leading workers at the enterprise, party committee members and plant veterans had a great effect on people. Then it became a tradition for the director, along with the fulfilling the production plan, to be always interested in how things stood in various shops with respect to the training of personnel in nonmilitarized formations. Such an approach was not to the liking of some shop chiefs. The proposal to reflect civil defense questions along with production indicators in the socialist pledges of each person in the collective caused misunderstanding at the outset. And again it became necessary for the director and party committee to intervene in order to explain the importance of these questions. In a resolution the party committee instructed all leaders to widely disseminate socialist competition among groups, sections and shops for better knowledge and practical implementation of the civil defense program. Moral and material incentives were devised so as to encourage those who resolve civil defense tasks more successfully. For instance, under the terms of the competition the section collective which emerges as the victor is awarded a certificate of honor and a cash prize and the shop collective which comes first is also awarded a challenge Red Banner. The names of the best activists are inscribed in the book of honor which is kept at the training center.

Much has changed in recent years in the organization of civil defense. A good material training base has been created and there is a method study room for superior command personnel, special classes and a model training town, which make it possible to hold exercises to a high standard with various formations to the full extent of the program. There are also several well-equipped defense installations. Some of them are compartments which, during training classes, are equipped with movie projectors for showing training films, whereas in others the shelves hold means of individual defense, medical supplies and communications equipment.

...The latest exercise in one of the shops began with the penetrating wail of sirens warning of an air attack. Without fuss, quickly and in an organized way the work shift occupied the well-equipped defense installations while the fighting men of the nonmilitarized formations set about carrying out their duties. The exercise was instructive. Many who distinguished themselves in the exercise were mentioned in the plant director's order [prikaz]. It was gratifying to Ivan Nikolayevich Bazuyev to see that all the plant workers greeted this with great interest. And where there is interest in work proceeding from an understanding of its importance, there can always be hope of success.

CSO: 1801

END